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ABSTRACT 
 Under a democratic political system, citizens expect their representatives to 
promote and protect their interests. Simultaneously, citizens hold their elected officials 
accountable for defending national interests. While the public has traditionally held 
federal officials accountable for regulating science and technology (S&T) industry, the 
widespread development and implementation of Internet services in the 1990’s raised 
questions among the public of who is truly responsible for protecting cybersecurity 
interests (Neal, et al., 2011, p. 36). Recently, the 2016 American presidential election has 
augmented public concerns over cybersecurity and data privacy with respect to artificial 
intelligence (AI) technology (Berger & Pappas, 2018, p. 1). In response to security 
concerns emerging regarding developing AI technologies, this report explores how 
federal policymakers may begin discussing how to regulate emerging AI technologies to 
assign legal responsibility for when such technologies do not perform as intended, and 
cause social, political, or economic harms. In this report, I review the benefits and 
drawbacks of federal policymaking procedures for S&T issues in the United States, with 
specific emphasis on who is responsible for writing congressional S&T policies. My 
analysis of the successes and failures of past congressional S&T policies indicates that 
partisan interests and the complexities of the federal policymaking process in the United 
States inhibit the creation of comprehensive and long-term S&T legislation. I determine 
that federal policymaking in the United States must become both more centralized and 
decentralized, simultaneously, so that federal lawmakers may begin discussing how to 
establish regulatory policies for the design and implementation of AI technologies.  
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Introduction 
 Under a democratic political system, citizens expect their representatives to 
promote and protect their interests. Citizens simultaneously hold their representatives 
accountable for defending national interests. While the public has traditionally held 
federal officials responsible for regulating science and technology (S&T) industry, the 
widespread development and implementation of Internet services starting in the 1990’s 
raised questions among the public of who is truly responsible for protecting cybersecurity 
interests. These questions were augmented by the start of the War on Terror under the 
Bush Administration, when the Department of Homeland Security was specifically 
established to consolidate federal research pertaining to national security, which included 
cybersecurity and data privacy research (Neal, et al., 2011, p. 36). Should the federal 
government be responsible for implementing regulatory policies pertaining to data 
security and privacy as new technological advancements are made within the S&T 
industry? Or should public and private companies be responsible for creating and 
implementing their own regulatory policies to protect the interests of their consumers? 
Can industry officials be relied upon to take regulatory action that protects the interests of 
their consumers? The complexities of both the federal regulatory system in the United 
States and the stability of developing technologies make it increasingly complex for 
individuals to determine who should be responsible for addressing these problems. At the 
federal level, it is especially difficult to regulate S&T issues because different federal 
authorities possess vastly different opinions of how such problems should be addressed. 
However, history demonstrates that S&T industry alone cannot be depended upon to 
design and impose regulatory policies for technological issues. It is necessary for federal 
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policymakers to begin establishing regulatory policies for specific forms of emerging 
technologies to provide guidance to S&T industry officials for improving the safety and 
security of their projects. 
 As one of the largest and most expansive new forms of technology being 
developed on the market, artificial intelligence (AI) technology is raising several 
questions regarding who is accountable for the collection of data by such machines. As 
AI systems are essentially self-managing, it is increasingly difficult to determine who is 
accountable for their behaviors and how they manage the data that they aggregate. 
Although artificial intelligence (AI) technology has been developed since the 1950’s 
(Peart, 2017, p. 1), it was not until the 2016 American presidential election that 
significant concerns regarding data security and privacy in relation to AI technology 
emerged among the public and the federal government. When Russian hackers utilized 
“bots,” a form of AI technology, to spread misinformation and propaganda on social-
networking platforms, federal officials questioned how readily other forms of artificially 
intelligent technologies could be intentionally misused or weaponized (Berger & Pappas, 
2018, p. 1). Moreover, after the election period concluded, the rapid development of 
additional AI technologies such as Windows’ Cortana and autonomous vehicles (AV) 
raised additional questions related to the security of such devices: when an artificially 
intelligent device unexpectedly behaves in a manner that causes physical, social, or 
political harm, who is accountable for the harm that was not intentionally caused? The 
objectives of this paper are not to encourage the elimination of AI machines and systems 
from society. Rather, this paper explores how federal policymakers may begin regulating 
emerging AI technologies to assign legal responsibility for when such machines produce 
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unintended or unanticipated harms. It would be unreasonable to assume that all types of 
AI devices, systems, and algorithms may be regulated under the same principles, across 
various industries. However, it is necessary for federal policymakers to begin devising 
how to standardize and stabilize AI research and development (R&D) to guide S&T 
industry officials, federal agencies, and federal (and state) courts in evaluating instances 
when AI systems jeopardize public safety and stability. 
 Throughout this paper, I qualitatively review the benefits and drawbacks of 
federal policymaking procedures for S&T issues in the United States, with specific 
emphasis on who is responsible for writing congressional S&T policies. My analysis of 
the successes and failures of past congressional S&T policies indicates that partisan 
interests and the complexities of the federal policymaking procedure in the United States 
inhibits the creation of comprehensive and long-term federal S&T policies. In order for 
federal officials to begin discussing how to establish federal regulations for the design 
and development of AI technology, my research further indicates that federal 
policymaking in the United States must become both more centralized and decentralized, 
simultaneously. Members of Congress and associated committees, as well as members of 
federal agencies, with experience in S&T policymaking must be aggregated into new 
policymaking bodies to discuss regulatory potential for AI technology. Such new 
policymaking bodies must then decentralize their authority to extend membership to 
appropriate officials of S&T industry. This would ensure that future regulatory 
discussions pertaining to AI technology address and protect both political and scientific 
interests.  
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AI Technology: Issues of Accountability Under Current Legal Doctrine  
 Although no two forms of AI technology are precisely alike in how they are 
designed or in how they operate, issues concerning legal responsibility are prominent 
across all types of AI systems. Federal policymakers may begin initiating regulatory 
discussion for AI technology by addressing how to identify legal responsibility when 
such systems, in general, malfunction. Before I review who is involved in the federal 
policymaking procedure for S&T issues, I dedicate the following section to defining what 
AI technology is by discussing different types of AI technologies and how they function. 
Through elaboration of different AI technologies, I identify why it is difficult to identify 
accountability for when AI systems, of all types, behave or perform in manners that 
jeopardize individuals’ physical, social, or data security. 
 The concept for AI technology was first introduced by mathematician, Alan 
Turing, in 1950, when Turing published a report that discussed how computer systems 
could be programmed to replicate human cognition (Huang, et. al., 2006, p. 5). In the 
mid-1950s, John McCarthy created the term “artificial intelligence” to refer to 
“intelligent” computer technologies (Peart, 2017, p. 1). As the development of artificial 
intelligence (AI) technology has constantly revolutionized throughout the twentieth 
century into the present, there is currently no formal definition for what this type of 
technology entails. However, the scientific and political communities generally 
acknowledge that artificial intelligence technology include computerized technology, 
such as algorithms, software, robots, or machines (Marshall, 2018, p. 1), that engage in 
rational decision-making and may replicate human thought processes (Rao, 2016, p. 1). 
Artificial intelligence technology also includes any technology that can modify its own 
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source-code or behaviors over time, which is largely known as “deep-learning” 
technology (Marshall, 2018, p. 1). (Nochimson, 2018, p. 5). 
 In recent years, the presence and implementation of artificial intelligence 
technology has become commonplace in various settings. For instance, under ordinary 
circumstances, most laptop users possess access to “virtual assistant” technologies, like 
Cortana and Siri, that are programmed to learn users’ voices to perform technical 
operations such as conducting phone calls, sending text messages and emails, and 
performing Internet searches. Individuals who shop online at retail websites may 
encounter AI technology in the form of customer service “chat bots,” which are 
programmed to interpret and react to textual input from shoppers. More commonly 
recognized, social-networking sites function as extensive sources for AI implementation, 
as most platforms utilize machine-learning algorithms to personally tailor advertisements 
and account-suggestions to users.  
 However, individuals are not solely exposed to AI technology in “online” 
settings. The transportation sector is now exposing individuals to autonomous vehicles 
(AV’s) in urban environments (Notis, 2018, p. 1), while medical industry officials are 
utilizing deep-learning algorithms in diagnostic imaging services to assist them in 
distinguishing between cancerous and non-cancerous cells in cancer patients (Troyanos, 
2018, p. 1). Whether or not individuals immediately recognize the presence or use of 
artificial intelligence technology in their daily lives, AI technologies have been integrated 
both into ordinary routines and specific industry environments in the twenty-first century.  
 As more types of artificially intelligent systems become developed and integrated 
into different facets of society, more opportunities arise for AI systems to unexpectedly 
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produce physical or social harms. When such circumstances transpire, lawmakers and 
legal authorities are responsible for determining who or “what” is liable for any damages 
caused. Unfortunately, the current legal system lacks regulatory precedent for assisting 
lawmakers in attributing liability in cases regarding harm produced by AI machines and 
systems. The following paragraphs provide examples of how different AI systems can 
produce unanticipated, harmful effects, with emphasis on the difficulty of assigning 
accountability for failures and malfunctions of such systems.      
 Of some of the more recognizable, developing AI technologies available to the 
public, autonomous vehicles (AV’s) are especially susceptible to experiencing 
technological malfunctions because of how they are programmed. As there is an infinite 
number of external stimuli (i.e. weather conditions, traffic patterns, traffic routes) for 
autonomous vehicles to react to, technological developers have programmed their 
algorithms to utilize inductive reasoning techniques. The scientific and engineering 
communities purposely program AV’s to use such reasoning techniques because they 
enable vehicles to use the data that they are initially programmed with to assess and react 
to their environments in infinite ways. However, while inductive programming enables 
AV’s to respond quickly and flexibly while in operation, such programming also makes it 
significantly difficult for scientists to fully test AV’s safety and stability prior to 
implementation. For instance, it is unpredictable as to how an autonomous vehicle may 
react when it encounters a situation in which the data it has been programmed with 
cannot accommodate (Koopman & Wagner, 2017, p. 90-96). If an autonomous vehicle 
does not recognize the presence of a pedestrian crossing the street, debris on the road(s), 
or the presence of a nearby vehicle, significant physical harm could be directed to parties 
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both inside and outside the vehicle. While accidents are unanticipated, it is unclear as to 
what extent the data that AV’s are initially programmed with should be responsible for 
anticipating all potential roadway conditions and accidents prior to the vehicles being 
introduced to the market. Moreover, it is unclear under conditions involving physical 
accidents whether the self-driving vehicle, its manufacturers or programmers, or 
individuals inside of the vehicle are responsible for any damages that are imposed. 
 Although autonomous vehicles are only a single representation of developing AI 
systems, their internal programming and lack of predictability are useful in that they 
demonstrate how AI systems may impose physical harm. For example, in Nilsson v. 
General Motors, LLC, the plaintiff was struck by an autonomous vehicle, with the self-
driving vehicle’s backup driver present inside the car at the time that the incident 
occurred. As the product (the autonomous vehicle) was not defective under current 
statutes for self-driving cars, the plaintiff sought to charge that General Motors and the 
vehicle’s backup driver were negligent in their design and management of the vehicle 
(Nilsson v. General Motors LLC, 2018). Although General Motors has since agreed to 
settle (Nguyen, 2018, p. 1), the case raises questions of how to assign negligence, 
liability, and criminality to artificially intelligent systems when physical damage is 
imposed by a machine. As artificially intelligent technologies, such as autonomous 
vehicles, modify their behaviors over time with operation, it is becoming increasingly 
difficult for the judicial system to determine “who” is at fault under circumstances where 
AI systems impose damages.  
 In addition to imposing physical damage, AI technology may also operate in 
manners that produce social damages. For example, Google’s primary search engine is 
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considered a form of AI technology because its underlying algorithm infers the meanings 
of users’ Internet searches based off analysis of key words and phrases. In 2010 and 
2012, Google received significant media attention when the algorithm underlying its 
search engine operated in racially discriminatory fashions. First, a user reported that 
when she searched for “black girls” on Google’s search engine, demeaning results of 
African American women pertaining to pornography and physical violence were among 
the top search results yielded. Two years later, when an Internet user searched for “black 
on white crime” via Google’s search engine, a website for a white supremacist 
organization, the Council of Conservative Citizens, was produced. This website, which 
Google’s algorithm listed as the “top” search result, falsified the notion that African 
Americans frequently assault white individuals by ignoring federal and state evidence 
that majority of crimes committed against white individuals are committed by other white 
persons (Berlatsky, 2018, p. 1).  
 For both the previously mentioned cases of racial discrimination pertaining to 
Google’s search-engine-algorithm, two arguments can be made regarding who is 
responsible for the social damages fostered by the algorithm’s behaviors. First, it is 
arguable that the search engine may have been initially programmed with data containing 
racial and social biases, which would account for why the algorithm was inclined to 
produce increasingly discriminatory results in operation (Berlatsky, 2018, p. 1). 
Contrastingly, it is arguable that because the search engine’s algorithm uses “deep-
learning” techniques, meaning, the algorithm “learns” how to generate results based off 
evaluation of content searched for and selected by users, it is possible that the algorithm 
learned how to “adopt” racial biases over time (Bloomberg, 2018, p. 1). While it is not 
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feasible to expect technological developers to anticipate all potential behaviors of their AI 
systems before they are implemented, the above examples raise questions of to what 
degree technological developers should be responsible for social damages caused by the 
behaviors of their AI projects.  
 While AI systems may produce unanticipated physical or social damages during 
operation, external actors may also actively manipulate the designs and uses of such 
machines to intentionally produce harm. During the 2016 American presidential election, 
AI technology was manipulated to diminish election security and influence public 
political sentiment. When Russian hackers used “bots” to disseminate propaganda and 
misinformation campaigns on social media networks, they damaged the political stability 
of the American election system by undermining the integrity of the presidential 
candidates (Polonski, 2017, p. 1) Although the First Amendment protects against the 
censoring of speech, regardless of its accuracy, the deliberate use of AI systems by 
external actors to undermine the American political system raises new security questions 
among the federal government. Federal authorities are now questioning whether external 
actors who manipulate AI systems should be responsible for the damages that are 
produced by their manipulations, or whether the designers of manipulated AI systems 
should have had more foresight for implementing technological safeguards against 
malicious actors. 
 As it is near impossible for scientists and technological developers to anticipate 
all potential issues and performance behaviors of AI systems during testing periods, it is 
challenging for federal policymakers and legal experts to determine who is accountable 
when AI systems unexpectedly produce physical or social harms, or when such systems 
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are manipulated in ways that cause harm (Tutt, 2016, p. 104). In part, the current lack of 
legal doctrine for assigning accountability to circumstances concerning AI-imposed 
damages may be attributed to ineffective communication between industry officials, legal 
experts, and government officials. As the establishment of legal precedent for 
technological issues requires consideration of preexisting statutes under multiple 
jurisdictions (intellectual property, torts, criminal, and international laws), it has been 
difficult to facilitate organized communication among the proper federal policymakers, 
and industry and legal experts for initiating regulatory discussions. Moreover, 
technological developers of both public and private enterprise are also hesitant to disclose 
the nature of their AI research in fear of diminishing the competitiveness of their products 
on the market. In turn, this further inhibits the creation of federal regulatory standards for 
AI technology by denying federal policymakers the technical information that would be 
beneficial for writing such policies (p. 102). Ultimately, it would be discouraging and 
unfair for federal policymakers to imply that it is the full responsibility of technological 
developers when their AI projects create harm, especially under conditions where any 
damages imposed are unforeseeable. However, to promote secure technological 
innovation, federal policymakers must begin discussing the potential for establishing 
baseline regulatory framework for testing AI systems, which would provide further 
guidance for assigning legal responsibility when AI systems produce physically and 
socially harmful impacts.  
 This section began by describing different examples of AI technologies to 
demonstrate the difficulty that lawmakers and legal experts face under current legal 
doctrine in assigning legal responsibility under circumstances where AI systems produce 
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harm. It discussed how difficult it is for federal policymakers to establish legal precedent 
for AI systems because it is near impossible for scientists and technological developers to 
anticipate all potential issues with their AI projects prior to implementation, even with 
extensive testing. The lack of communication between federal policymakers, 
technological industry officials, and legal experts also inhibits the creation of successful 
regulatory policy pertaining to artificially intelligent technology. It further emphasized 
that even if regulatory discussions regarding AI technology are successfully initiated at 
the federal level, there are multiple different types of AI technologies on the market, as 
well as multiple environments in which such technologies may be implemented. To an 
extent, policy proposals must contain some clauses that could be applied to specific 
machines and systems, and their designated operational environments. However, rather 
than discuss the potential for regulating specific forms of AI technology, the following 
sections will discuss how federal policymakers organize resources for creating federal 
regulations for AI research and development (R&D), broadly. 
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Who Makes Federal Science and Technology Policies? 
 As with all types of S&T policy issues, it is challenging for federal policymakers 
to establish a regulatory framework for AI technologies because they must orchestrate 
communication between numerous actors from different sectors of government and 
industry to create comprehensive policies. However, certain sectors of government 
traditionally maintain more authority in the federal policymaking procedure for S&T 
issues than others. This section explores the responsibilities of federal actors within the 
three primary branches of government in creating federal S&T policies and later 
addresses how non-governmental and industry resources influence the creation of federal 
S&T policies.  
 At the broad-level, congressional authorities, members of federal agencies, and 
experts of the science and engineering communities collaborate to address S&T policy 
issues (Neal et al., 2011, p. 55). However, Congress and technologically-focused federal 
agencies that are established under the Executive Branch are usually the entities that are 
most responsible for shaping federal S&T policies. Depending upon the S&T policy 
issues in discussion, Congress and federal agencies may also coordinate communication 
with other federal resources: congressional committees and subcommittees, The Office of 
Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 
and non-governmental agencies, such as technological industry experts and non-profit 
organizations. S&T research conducted by national laboratories and universities may also 
be consulted by federal legislators during the policymaking process, but generally possess 
less authority in directing policy debates (p. 54). Additionally, members of the federal 
court system may impact how S&T legislation is implemented and reinforced depending 
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upon how they interpret federal policies and establish legal precedents between cases (p. 
55). 
I. Executive Branch 
 Historically, the Executive branch possesses significant influence over the 
creation of S&T legislation. While Presidents have traditionally contributed to S&T 
policy debates through direct communication with congressional authorities and their 
science and national security advisors, (Neal, et al., 2011, p. 28), Presidents have 
generally shaped S&T policy initiatives by establishing federal councils or agencies via 
Executive Orders since the 1990s. For instance, in 1990, George H. W. Bush established 
the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) via Executive 
Order (E.O. 13226) to create a centralized, federal resource for organizing 
communication between S&T industry officials and academia. President Bush largely 
established this Council because he recognized that there needed to be increased 
collaboration between scientists, engineers, and scholars from outside the government to 
contribute non-political perspectives to federal S&T policy discussion (p. 29). E.O. 
13226 has since been overridden by E.O. 13539, which was issued by President Obama 
during his first presidential term to expand the PCAST established by President Bush to 
increase the number of non-governmental members advising the President on S&T policy 
issues (Porter, et al., 2019, p. 1). Later, in 1993, President Clinton established the 
National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) via Executive Order (E.O. 12881) to 
coordinate space and technology discussions between engineers and federal 
policymakers. The purpose of this order was to ensure that presidential S&T policy 
agenda pertaining to space exploration included the perspectives of technology industry 
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and engineering experts (Neal, et al., 2011, p. 30). While such executive orders are 
seemingly beneficial because they proclaim to integrate non-governmental, scientific 
industry expertise into federal, S&T policy discussions, these executive orders provide no 
means of assessing to what extent non-governmental perspective is incorporated into 
federal policy discussions.   
 Federal agencies that operate within the Executive Branch also contribute S&T 
policy research to, and shape the agenda of, both Presidents and Congress. As of 2011, 
there are more than thirty cabinet-level departments and federal agencies that provide 
funding for S&T policy research (Neal, et al., 2011, p. 26). Currently, several existing 
federal agencies were originally established to address partisan conflicts and S&T policy 
issues of specific presidential administrations. For example, the Department of Defense 
(DoD) was established by President Truman in 1947 to conduct biological and chemical 
warfare research for the military after the conclusion of WWII (p. 34). The Department of 
Energy (DoE) was created in 1977 by the Carter Administration to inform the Secretary 
of Energy on science policy issues, and to help coordinate multidisciplinary activities 
across the federal government, national laboratories, and technology centers pertaining to 
energy projects in response to increasing environmental health concerns raised by the 
public (p. 35). Among the most notable federal actions of the twenty-first century, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established in response to the September 
11th terror attacks to centralize communication and research pertaining to national 
security matters across federal agencies (p. 36).  
 In general, federal agencies may create and implement their own internal 
operating procedures so long as they follow federal laws that are established by Congress. 
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Federal agencies’ relative freedom to self-regulate also includes the ability to determine 
how to divide research and development funding approved by the Congressional 
Appropriations Committees (Neal, et al., 2011, p. 56), and the ability to interpret the 
language of congressional policies to decide how they should be implemented. 
Unfortunately, S&T policy research that is conducted by federal agencies may be 
influenced by partisan pressures when political stipulations are attached to the research 
budgets that agencies are granted by Congress (Kraemer, S. K., 2006, p. 55).1  
History demonstrates that when federal agencies are established, their initial research and 
policy projects are often significantly dictated by political interests that are present in 
Congress and their respective presidential administrations.  
 In terms of executive officials’ responsibilities in creating federal S&T 
legislation, there are two themes that arise from the above discussion. First, Presidents 
and their administrations often contribute to S&T policy discussions by directly 
communicating with their science and national security advisors, as well as congressional 
authorities. Presidents also display a history of establishing new federal agencies via 
Executive Orders to address specific S&T policy issues as they arise. Second, federal 
agencies may be designated as centers of enforcement for presidential or congressional 
policy initiatives, and they can often interpret how to reinforce congressional policies. 
Collectively, Presidents, their administrations, and federal agencies can be subject to 
political pressures when establishing S&T policy agenda.  
                                                           
1 Federal agencies may also be subject to policy-pressures by members of the intelligence community. 
Additionally, intelligence officials may also be hesitant to discuss the security of American technology and 
technological systems with federal legislators in fear of alluding to technological vulnerabilities that would 
weaken any combative advantages that the U.S. military possesses over foreign adversaries (Sanger, 2018, 
p. xiv). However, for purposes of time and scope, this report does not further discuss the relationships 
between Congress and the intelligence community.   
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II. Legislative Branch 
 As the governing body that is responsible for authorizing the funding of and 
overseeing the actions of federal agencies (Neal, et al., 2011, p. 40), Congress possesses 
the most authority in creating and establishing federal S&T policies (p. 39). While a 
congressperson may write a bill him/herself, bills are usually written by members of a 
congressperson’s staff (p. 59) and are often subject to review by multiple congressional 
committees (p. 56). Specifically, Congressional Authorization Committees produce and 
review bills that direct S&T policy initiatives and authorize the establishment of new 
federal agencies. The following House Authorization Committees possess significant 
authority in shaping the direction of federal S&T policies: Science and Technology, 
Energy and Commerce, Agriculture, Armed Services. There are also Senate 
Authorization Committees that influence the direction of S&T policies: The Committee 
of Commerce, Committee of Science, Committee of Transportation, Committee of 
Energy, etc. (p. 57). When such House and Senate Authorization Committees approve of 
the language of proposed congressional bills, they may generate reports that suggest that 
the bills be formally debated on the House or Senate floors (p. 57). Often, these reports 
clarify congressional policy intent and provide guidance to federal agencies for 
addressing specific S&T policy issues (p. 57). Ideally, congressional policy initiatives 
consider S&T concerns that are prevalent among the public and scientific communities as 
important issues for federal regulation. However, congressional authorities are likely to 
suggest S&T policy agenda in response to partisan interests and significant political  
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events2. Additionally, due to the large number of House and Senate Committees within 
Congress, there is often difficulty among congressmen and congresswomen in 
determining which congressional committees should possess jurisdiction for addressing 
specific S&T issues. When members of Congress struggle to determine policy 
jurisdiction for specific S&T concerns, the legislative progress stagnates (p. 56).  
 Congressional support agencies that are affiliated with congressional committees 
may also assist congressmen and congresswomen in determining federal S&T policy 
initiatives, and in writing S&T bills. While congressional support agencies are not a part 
of members’ personal or committee offices, they enhance the federal policymaking 
process by conducting policy studies and budgetary analysis for both congressional 
committees and individual members. As an example of this type of congressional support 
agency, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) is a public policy center within the 
Library of Congress that generates background research on S&T issues. The Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) also provides significant policy assistance to Congress by 
investigating whether federal agencies and associated programs are utilizing their 
congressional funding as dictated by the appropriate Congressional Authorization 
Committees. Additionally, another notable congressional support agency is the Office of 
Legislative Council (OLC), which provides congressmen and congressional committees 
with legal advice when they create legislation. The OLC is an especially useful resource 
for congressional staff, as most bills that are introduced in Congress are eventually 
reviewed and revised by either the House or Senate Office of Legislative Council (Neal, 
                                                           
2 Like federal agencies, congressional authorities may also be subject to pressures from members of the 
intelligence community to address specific S&T issues. However, as stated before, this topic is not further 
discussed in this report due to constraints of time and scope.    
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et al., 2011, p. 41).3 However, despite having an extensive support network for obtaining 
information regarding S&T policy concerns, congresspersons and their staff still maintain 
the authority to disregard these entities’ input when writing legislation. This can be 
dangerous when Congress purposely disregards certain policy perspectives for purposes 
of preserving partisan interests when writing legislation (p. 63). 
 Aside from when congresspersons and their staffs first draft bills, partisan 
interests may also impact the language and directions of legislation after it is introduced 
to the House or Senate floor. After bills are first introduced to the House or Senate floor, 
they are referred to standing committees where subcommittees determine whether the 
bills should be further discussed or discarded (Neal, et al., 2011, p. 59). Here, several 
issues may pose as challenges to the creation of long-term, effective S&T policy. First, 
when congressional subcommittees are assigned with proposed legislation to review, they 
specify the intent and scope of the legislation as per their interpretations of it. Depending 
upon which congressional committees are tasked with reviewing proposed bills, 
policymakers may elect not to consult with technological industry officials, scientists, 
and engineers to gain non-political feedback regarding the proposed legislation. This 
generates potential for non-political, scientific interests to be overshadowed by political 
priorities within Congress (p. 60). Second, although federal policymaking is designed to 
be pluralist and decentralized under the American democratic system, the decentralized 
nature of congressional policymaking serves as a barrier to enacting comprehensive S&T 
                                                           
3 Congressional authorities may obtain additional information regarding S&T issues from executive 
councils, such as the National Security and Technology Council and the Office of Science and Technology 
Policy but possess the authority to ultimately disregard their input when writing legislation (Neal, et al., 
2011, p. 63). 
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policies because congressional authorities often struggle to establish jurisdiction between 
House and Senate subcommittees for reviewing proposed legislation. Partisan conflicts 
often confuse matters regarding jurisdiction further (p. 57). Thirdly, as with the 
presidential agenda, congressional agendas are susceptible to influence by significant 
political events, public opinion, and concerns from national interest groups (Fealing, et 
al., 2011, p. 327). When congressional authorities address S&T policy issues with respect 
to select political events and groups’ concerns, they may fail to incorporate both political 
and scientific input, together, into regulatory suggestions.    
 As the primary policymaking body in the United States government, Congress 
maintains the most authority for creating and establishing S&T legislation. Specifically, 
congressional staff and members of Senate and House committees often possess the most 
influence over the direction of S&T policy discussions. However, congressional 
authorities usually struggle to determine jurisdiction between congressional committees 
because S&T policy issues require input from multiple actors. The difficulty of assigning 
policy jurisdiction between congressional committees often inhibits the pace of the 
federal legislative process, which may further be impacted by budgetary and partisan 
disagreements between congressional support agencies and authorities. Additionally, 
when congressional officials disproportionately defer to the President, his administration, 
or national interest groups for determining S&T policy agenda, there is the potential for 
legislators to disregard public concerns, or disproportionately prioritize political concerns 
in writing policy. Moreover, federal policymaking procedure in the United States neither 
guarantees that technological industry officials, scientists, and engineers can provide 
policy input as bills are being created, nor guarantees that their perspectives will be 
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factored into formal debates between congressional authorities.  
III. Non-governmental Entities and Industry Resources 
 In addition to federal agencies and congressional resources, non-governmental 
entities and technological industry resources may also influence federal S&T policy 
discussion. Depending upon the missions of non-governmental agencies, their officials 
may emphasize the incorporation of scientific and engineering research into federal 
policy proposals. For example, the National Academy of Sciences and the National 
Academy of Engineering generates research reports that collect the insight of scientists 
and engineers, respectively, on challenges pertaining to emerging technological systems. 
The reports generated by these private, non-profit agencies are often utilized by federal 
policymakers to supplement federal research and knowledge of technological issues when 
writing federal legislation (Neal, et al., 2011, p. 44). Professional societies like the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) also assist federal 
policymakers in drafting S&T legislation by offering federal budget analyses for bills that 
are drafted and introduced to Congress (p. 45). Additionally, think-tank organizations, 
which may either be partisan or non-partisan, are also significant contributors of S&T 
policy research to federal agencies and congressional authorities. The Center for Strategic 
International Studies, for example, has nearly two-hundred research scholars and support 
staff that help review the budgets of federal agencies, like the DOE (p. 45).  
 Unlike with non-governmental agencies and think-tank organizations, there is a 
challenging relationship between Congress and S&T industry sources. Historically, the 
federal government is hesitant to impose restrictions on research and development in the 
S&T industry because federal officials do not want to stifle or discourage technological 
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development. Simultaneously, public and private industry officials are also hesitant to 
communicate with federal authorities to discuss regulatory policies for S&T 
development, in fear of publicizing their R&D projects or exposing potential safety 
concerns with their projects (Neal, et al., 2011, p. 144). While federal policymakers still 
rely upon S&T industry officials for technical expertise on policy issues concerning 
national and homeland security (p. 135), there is currently a lack of communication 
between federal authorities and industry sources for regulating emerging technologies 
that must be overcome to effectively discuss regulatory potential for AI technology. 4   
                                                           
4 Contrastingly, congressional authorities may disregard concerns among the science and engineering 
communities in efforts to prioritize political interests, as discussed in the above paragraphs.   
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How Does Congress Decide Which S&T Policy Issues Are Important? 
 The numerous federal and non-federal entities who may contribute S&T policy 
research and agenda to congressional discussions complicates the federal policymaking 
process. In the Politics of Information: Problem Definition and the Court of Public Policy 
in America, Baumgartner and Jones note that diverse sources of information enable the 
creation of more intensive federal policies. However, federal policymakers must carefully 
search for policy issues to access helpful sources for addressing them (2015, p. 6). 
Baumgartner and Jones further note in The Politics of Attention: How Government 
Prioritizes Problems that the direction of federal policy agenda is influenced by 
deliberate attempts by legislators to filter policy research and information in manners that 
preserve current policies and institutional arrangements (2005, p. 3). In this section, I 
primarily review how federal policymakers have decided which S&T policy issues to 
address in the past, and how the federal government establishes S&T policy agenda in the 
present. Largely, I discuss how S&T policy issues are identified in response to significant 
political and social events. I conclude this section by discussing how the 2016 
presidential election inspired federal attention toward the regulation of emerging AI 
technologies.  
 Throughout the twentieth century, federal S&T research was largely initiated in 
response to domestic and international political conflicts. For example, when WWII 
concluded, the federal government initially felt less pressure to allocate federal funding to 
S&T research and development, at least in relation to military weapons and development. 
However, when the U.S.S.R. launched Sputnik in 1957, the United States government 
became fearful that the Soviet Union was gaining strength as a national security threat to 
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the United States. As the American public had already been growing increasingly fearful 
of communist forces infiltrating the United States after WWII ended, federal officials 
considered the U.S.S.R.’s entrance into space a threat that was significant enough to 
warrant action by the federal government. After Sputnik was launched, federal attention 
toward space exploration increased, and spending in space research and technology 
increased across the federal government (Neal, et al., 2011, p. 21). The national security 
fears created by the U.S.S.R.’s successful launching of Sputnik inspired Congress and 
President Eisenhower to create NASA through the National Aeronautics and Space Act 
of 1958 (p. 34). 
 About a decade later, Congress began establishing new federal agencies in 
response to environmental health concerns. In the 1970’s, petroleum shortages and 
increasing levels of environmental pollution caused by manufacturing and industry sites 
inspired Congress to pass series of legislation aimed at addressing environmental 
concerns. Notably, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970 was utilized to 
establish the Environmental Protection Agency to oversee increasing public demand for 
clean air, land and water throughout the country. Additionally, the Department of Energy 
was created by the Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977 to organize 
collaboration between federal officials, scientists, and engineers to create a national 
energy plan (Neal, et al., 2011, p. 336).  
 In the twenty-first century, Congress established significant S&T policies in 
response to the September 11th terror attacks. After the attacks, the Bush Administration 
launched the “Global War on Terrorism” and the federal government became fearful that 
WMD were being developed in Iraq. In response to increasing national security and 
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cybersecurity concerns within the federal government, Congress passed both the USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001 and the Bioterrorism Act of 2002 (Neal, et al., 2011, p. 58)5. 
Perhaps even more significant, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was 
established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The DHS was specifically established 
to consolidate all national security agencies in the United States to facilitate more 
efficient communication and federal funding for national security matters. In this sense, 
the DHS acts as a centralized source for national security policy research, where its role 
is constantly evolving with respect to emerging national security threats (p. 36). As 
United States telecommunications, electrical, and business industries have become 
increasingly reliant upon Internet services, it is expected that the DHS will conduct more 
policy and defense research concerning cybersecurity in the coming years. Cybersecurity 
research is becoming increasingly important for American infrastructure because 
cyberattacks can be launched from either domestic or international locations (p. 315).  
 Unfortunately, congressional policies that were enacted in response to the 
September 11th terror attacks have also placed significant strain on research and 
development among the scientific and engineering communities6. The War on Terror has 
raised questions among federal legislators about whether the pursuit of knowledge and 
innovation can ultimately be harmful to national security (Neal, et. al. 2011, p. 319). As 
evidenced by the Bioterrorism Act of 2002, Congress largely restricted scientists from 
                                                           
5 Congressional officials, their staff, and their cabinets also select S&T policy issues based off their 
constituents’ interests, as well. The USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001 and the Bioterrorism Act of 2002 were 
also responses to increasing fears of terrorism and technological security among the public after the 
September 11th terror attacks. 
6 Mass data collection by the federal government transpired before the September 11th attacks. 
Congressional constraints on S&T research also strained the NSA, which had been mass-collecting 
surveillance data since before 2001.  
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acquiring certain biological agents and materials for research in fear that publication of 
certain types of research could be accessed by foreign entities and weaponized against the 
United States (p. 320). Scientific funding for university research has also served as a 
barrier for S&T research and development in recent years, emphasizing the necessity for 
federal policymakers to define a point at which they are comfortable with allowing S&T 
research to be conducted. Concerns over terrorism and national security threats, and 
largely cybersecurity threats in recent years, have raised questions of how federal 
policymakers should support S&T research and development in modern times. The 
difficulty of answering this question lies in that scientists and publishers often do not 
know what the results of their projects will entail until they are near completion or are 
already completed (p. 325). 
 Currently, scientists’ inability to fully predict the behaviors and performances of 
their artificially intelligent, machine-learning projects is creating unease among the 
federal government, especially due to the 2016 Presidential election. Newfound federal 
attention toward the safety and stability of AI technology may be attributed to the 
Russian hackings of the 2016 presidential election. When hackers weaponized social 
media networks’ AI algorithms to undermine the democratic election system, they 
exposed the vulnerability of social media companies’ data privacy policies and the 
current lack of federal policy for managing electronic data collection and online 
information-sharing practices (Berger & Pappas, 2018, p. 1). The primary significance of 
the Russian information-attacks is that they spawned fear among the American public 
that the AI algorithms used by social media companies jeopardized users’ personal 
information and negatively impacted the election. At the federal level, policymakers view 
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this incident as an example of how technologies that are encountered daily by ordinary 
citizens can be manipulated and weaponized to undermine the democratic election 
system. In response to public and federal concerns about AI technology, data security, 
and individual liberty that emerged with respect to the 2016 presidential election, 
Congress introduced three separate bills regarding the development and implementation 
of AI technology between 2017 and 2018. As of February 2019, President Trump has 
also established a new Executive Order titled “Maintaining American Leadership in 
Artificial Intelligence” to address AI security concerns, as well.   
 Overall, it appears as though significant legislative shifts occur when the federal 
government responds to large-scale political and social events. While policies that 
emerge from major political events are often created with beneficial intentions, they may 
be harmful to the scientific community when scientists and technologists are unable to 
predict all potential issues of their R&D projects before they are implemented. This 
emphasizes my primary questions from earlier in this report: who is truly accountable for 
when a technological system does not behave in the manner that it was designed to?  
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Barriers to Effective Federal S&T Policymaking 
I. Congress Lacks Foresight  
 Historically, it is common for members of Congress to establish S&T legislation 
in response to significant political events. However, even when bipartisan agreement is 
reached within the House and Senate to pass new legislation, there are no means for 
anticipating how long federal S&T policies will remain appropriate for addressing their 
respective issues before they become obsolete. With respect to AI technology, constant 
innovation makes it challenging for federal policymakers to determine how to write 
regulatory policies. Depending upon the scientific or technological issues that federal 
policies are designed to address, policies may become obsolete shortly after they are 
enacted. However, the long-term efficiency of federal S&T policies is also inhibited 
when congressional authorities lack the necessary technical knowledge and expertise for 
writing S&T policies in manners that can anticipate and accommodate technological 
innovation. In the following section, I refer to the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to 
explain how a lack of technical knowledge among congressional officials may stifle the 
creation of long-term, federal S&T policy.  
 Prior to the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the original 
Telecommunications Act (1934) was unable to accommodate technological innovation in 
the telecommunications industry, and the development of corporate monopolies within 
the industry throughout the latter half of the twentieth century. As technological 
developments transpired in the telecommunications industry, local cable and telephone 
companies were excluded from the market by large competitors, like AT&T, whose 
wealth afforded them opportunities to control most of the telecommunications services 
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offered. Not only did the wealth of larger companies limit market competition, but it also 
granted larger companies more power in establishing pricing for consumers to access 
telephone lines and long-distance services (Nuechterlein & Weiser, 2013, p. 50). As the 
mid-1990’s approached, federal authorities recognized the need to increase competition 
among telecommunications services to grant greater market freedom to both local 
companies and consumers. As a result, congressional officials collaborated with members 
of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and Justice Department to revise the 
Telecommunications Act of 1934. As federal policymakers’ primary motives for revising 
the Act were to regulate the telecommunications market and augment competition 
between companies, lawmakers disregarded the potential for technological advancement 
in the telecommunications industry when revising the original policy. In turn, lawmakers 
failed to consult with telecommunications industry officials when revising the Act. As a 
result, the 1996 version of the Act largely adhered to the original version’s policies and 
assumptions regarding the technological capabilities of cable and telephone companies. 
As the original Act failed to accommodate technological innovation that had occurred 
throughout the twentieth century, prior to the 1990s, the 1996 version of the Act 
subsequently failed to accommodate majority of the technological changes that transpired 
in the telecommunications industry entering the twenty-first century (p. 51)7.  
 Because congressional authorities did not acquire the technical expertise of 
telecommunications industry officials when revising the Telecommunications Act,  
                                                           
7 While a lack of communication between congressional authorities and external, non-governmental 
sources can sometimes hinder a congressional bill’s effectiveness after it is enacted, the pace of the 
congressional policymaking process can also limit a federal policy’s appropriateness when it is enacted. 
When bills are written with respect to time-sensitive social, political, or economic issues, the amount of 
time spent creating and debating a specific bill may negatively impact how appropriate that bill is for 
addressing a specific situation if it becomes approved. 
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portions of the 1996 version of the Act became obsolete shortly after the bill was enacted. 
For example, when Congress wrote the Telecommunications Act of 1996, lawmakers 
largely assumed that cable and telephone companies would always possess limited 
interaction with each other and would offer customers distinct telecommunications 
services, as was assumed by the original Act of 1934 (Nuechterlein & Weiser, 2013, p. 
230). However, shortly after the 1996 bill was passed, broadband Internet service 
packages challenged the bill’s assumptions by demonstrating that data, cable, and 
telephone functions could be designed to interact and perform similar services altogether, 
as they had done separately for decades.8 The development of broadband Internet 
services, like VoIP (voice over Internet Protocol, like Skype), by cable companies 
enabled individuals to utilize the Internet as a medium for conducting activities, like 
phone calls, that were traditionally only feasible through telephone companies (p. 192).  
 As federal policymakers did not consider the possibility that traditional 
telecommunication services would become intertwined when they revised the original 
Telecommunications Act, the development of broadband Internet services posed several 
regulatory challenges for the FCC, which was the federal agency most responsible for 
upholding the parameters of the 1996 bill. First, as the 1996 bill did not specify how to 
“define” new Internet services that were a combination of telephone and cable services, 
the FCC was unsure whether to classify broadband Internet service as a 
telecommunications service, or an information service under the Act. This challenge is 
                                                           
8 Prior to 1996, most consumers in residential neighborhoods relied upon their telephone carriers to access 
Internet services through dial-up modems. However, cable companies soon determined that they could 
extend Internet services to residential locations without dialup services by directly collaborating with 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to provide consumers with Internet access without involving telephone 
companies (Nuechterlein & Weiser, 2013, p. 192). 
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significant because a telecommunication service’s “classification” establishes different 
precedent for interstate commerce and communication. Second, broadband Internet 
services, like VoIP, provided telephone-like services wirelessly. The 1996 bill did not 
specify how wireless Internet services should be regulated under federal law 
(Nuechterlein & Weiser, 2013, p. 231). Third, partisan pressures during the end of the 
twentieth century initially stagnated action by FCC officials to classify such Internet 
services. It was not until 2002 that FCC officials decided to declare that broadband 
Internet services could not be regulated under the 1996 version of the Act (p. 195). 
Arguably, congressional authorities would not have been able to anticipate all these 
regulatory challenges even if they had communicated with telecommunications industry 
officials when revising the bill. However, congressional officials’ failure to acknowledge 
the potential for future technological advancements in the telecommunications industry 
suggests that their lack of technical expertise is largely responsible for the establishment 
of a bill that was inefficient for long-term implementation.  
 As with telecommunications policies, the rapid pace of technological innovation 
creates potential for future AI regulatory policies to become obsolete after they are 
written, even if federal policymakers consult with S&T industry officials when writing 
legislation. However, the regulatory failures of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
demonstrate that federal policies possess greater potential to accommodate future 
innovation when they are written with consideration of industry officials’ technical 
expertise. As AI technology constantly evolves, and new technologies constantly emerge, 
policymakers must refer to industry input when writing regulatory policies to ensure that 
they will not immediately become obsolete upon enactment.  
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II. Legislative Disconnects between Congress and the Court System 
 In addition to enabling the creation of federal policies that fail to anticipate and 
accommodate technological innovation over time, congressional authorities’ lack of 
technical expertise may also enable the creation of federal policies that lack clear and 
unambiguous regulatory instructions. When a bill’s regulatory parameters are unclear, it 
can be especially challenging for federal agencies and courts to interpret them. This 
section refers to both the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the 1930 Plant Patent Act 
to demonstrate how a lack of technical expertise among congressional officials can make 
it difficult for federal agencies and courts to reinforce federal legislation. As AI 
technologies differ in design and application, lawmakers must carefully define the terms 
and clauses of regulatory policies so that they are appropriate for different technologies. 
 The language of federal legislation can create significant confusion among federal 
courts with respect to how to federal policies should be reinforced. For example, due to 
partisan pressures and a lack of technical knowledge, congressional authorities 
deliberately defined federal and state jurisdiction for the regulation of local wireline 
competition vaguely in the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The vagueness of the bill’s 
parameters made it unclear as to what the FCC’s and state governments’ respective roles 
were in establishing local provisions for future wireline competition (Nuechterlein & 
Weiser, 2013, p. 60). As guidelines for regulating local wireline services were unclear 
under the bill, the Eighth Circuit decided in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board (1999) 
that Congress had intended to give individual state governments the authority to regulate 
interstate and intrastate competition separately. However, the Supreme Court later 
overruled the Eight Circuit’s decision by claiming that the FCC has primary rulemaking 
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authority to monitor local competition under the original version of the Act (from 1934), 
which indicates that the FCC has modern, dual-jurisdiction to regulate interstate and 
intrastate matters through direct collaboration with state governments (p. 61). Had 
congressional authorities explicitly stated in the 1996 version of the Act that both the 
FCC and state governments possessed jurisdiction in regulating interstate and intrastate 
affairs, they could have prevented such disputes within the federal court system. 
However, congressional officials’ lack of technical foresight and partisan interests 
induced them to write portions of the bill ambiguously to aid in its passing in Congress. 
As a result, the bill’s regulatory ambiguities created difficulties for the FCC, state 
governments, and court system to successfully enforce the bill. This example powerfully 
demonstrates that both lawmakers’ personal interests and lack of technical knowledge 
can inhibit the creation of clearly written legislation.  
 Additionally, when congressional authorities write legislation with ambiguous 
language, they may also mislead members of the federal court system into interpreting 
policies in manners that they did not intend. For instance, since the 1980’s, legal disputes 
regarding patent infringements have multiplied tenfold (Kraemer, 2006, p. 80). Of the 
more significant patent cases determined by the Supreme Court, the Court narrowly ruled 
in Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980) that biological microbes are man-made bacteria and 
are therefore patentable under federal law (p. 82). In this case, the Supreme Court 
reached its ruling by establishing new precedent for the 1930 Plant Patent Act. When 
congressional policymakers first wrote the 1930 Plant Patent Act, they could have 
distinguished between animate and inanimate things, which would have enabled 
policymakers to exclude preexisting, living things found in nature from being patentable 
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under the statute (p. 83). However, because congressional did not make this distinction, 
the Supreme Court interpreted bacteria microbes as “patentable,” through consideration 
of “living and nonliving” things with “manmade things.” Regardless of whether 
lawmakers chose not to distinguish between animate and inanimate things in the 1930 
Plant Patent Act because they lacked the foresight that such a distinction would someday 
be necessary, or because they lacked knowledge of potential for biological advancements, 
this case demonstrates how ambiguity in congressional language may enable the courts to 
interpret federal policies in manners that were not intended. The ambiguous language of 
the 1930 Plant Patent Act led the Court to interpret the Act in a manner that made a strain 
of bacteria that is dangerous to human health patentable. With respect to the regulation of 
AI technology, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Plant Patent Act of 1930 show 
that policy language must be clear for federal agencies and courts to determine how to 
interpret, apply, and enforce regulations for emerging technologies.  
III. Political Interests in Congress 
 Aside from a lack of technical expertise among federal policymakers and 
ambiguous policy language, the creation of long-term, AI regulatory policies may also be 
hindered by partisan disputes. For example, the National Science Board (NSB) 
established the National Science Foundation (NSF) in 1950 so that members of Congress 
could recruit top academic and industrial leaders in various fields of S&T to serve as 
resources for S&T policy issues. Divided into seven directorates of major fields of 
science, the NSF is responsible for conducting basic S&T research, providing research 
grants for use in engineering centers, and serving as a resource for writing federal S&T 
policies (Neal, et. al. 2011, p. 32). However, leading into the 1970s, congressional 
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officials deemed the NSF inefficient for supporting research in the social sciences, even 
though the NSF was encouraged to do so upon its establishment. Specifically, at the 
behest of the growing environmental justice movement in the late 1960s, congressional 
officials disapproved of the lack of research that the NSF was conducting with respect to 
environmental protection and sustainability. Additionally, congressional officials found 
that the NSF was not contributing advice to creating comprehensive, national S&T policy 
as extensively as lawmakers had initially desired. As a result, congressional hearings 
were held in 1968 to modify the NSF’s charter to allocate more funding for applied 
scientific research and the social sciences, even though the scientific community feared 
this would detract from support for traditional science and engineering initiatives. 
Congress’ revisions to the NSF’s charter ultimately resulted in shifts in management for 
the NSF from members of the scientific community to political actors who are appointed 
by the President and confirmed by the Senate (Kraemer, 2006, p. 46).  
 I do not claim that political officials are incapable of interpreting and 
understanding research initiatives taken by members of the scientific community. 
However, this example reveals how changes in partisan interests can modify how 
congressional officials perceive scientific initiatives over time. In revising the charter of 
the NSF, Congress generated opportunities for political interests to be promoted over 
scientific interests. Social science research was granted newfound importance, which 
detracted from NSF officials’ abilities to fund basic scientific research to the extent that 
they were able to previously. Therefore, depending upon what members of the political 
and scientific communities consider important, it can be difficult for federal policymakers 
to create S&T regulatory policies because politicians and scientists often possess 
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different opinions regarding what types of science should be supported. When partisan 
disagreements prevent consensus on how and why AI technology should be regulated, 
they stagnate the creation of legislation that could improve technological security and 
stability in the present, as such technologies emerge on the market.  
 In sum, the above section has identified several barriers to the creation of long-
term, federal S&T policies. First, when congressional policymakers lack technical 
expertise regarding the S&T issues that they are attempting to establish regulatory 
precedent for, resultant policies may not be able to accommodate or regulate future 
technological developments, as seen with the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The 
failures of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to either anticipate or acknowledge the 
potential for wireless technological development demonstrates the necessity for federal 
policymakers to augment communication with appropriate S&T industry officials when 
writing regulatory bills.  
 A bill’s language also determines its implementation. As evidenced both by the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the 1930 Plant Patent Act, unclear and ambiguous 
language can impact the how federal agencies and courts interpret and reinforce federal 
policies. The confusion a bill’s language may incite is especially problematic when the 
court system misinterprets the initiatives of a bill in manners that deviate from 
policymakers’ intentions. 
 Lastly, partisan interests also impact the creation of a federal S&T policy agenda. 
Specifically, partisan interests can influence how S&T regulatory policies are designed 
and can determine which S&T policy issues are most deserving of attention and funding, 
even if members of the scientific community disagree.  
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Recent Federal Motions for AI Regulations  
 Although there are several barriers that federal policymakers must overcome to 
develop and establish S&T policies, congressional authorities successfully collaborated 
between 2017 and 2018 to write three separate bills for addressing the regulatory 
potential of AI technology. While none of these three congressional bills have been 
passed in either the House or Senate, they provide insight into federal policymakers’ 
perspectives for regulating AI technologies and provide guidance as to how federal 
policymakers may shape future regulatory discussions for AI technology. President 
Trump’s new Executive Order (E.O. 13859) regarding AI technology that was signed in 
February 2019 also provides insight as to how federal lawmakers may begin discussing 
regulatory potential for emerging AI technology. On the following page is a table that 
organizes the definitions and policy initiatives of the three AI bills that have been 
introduced in Congress and President Trumps’ Executive Order. The table primarily 
displays the policy initiatives of the bills and E.O. that pertain to national security, data 
privacy, and information security, but are not exhaustive of all the initiatives and 
guidelines specified in their official documentation. All information included within the 
table has been extracted directly from the textual language of the congressional bills and 
E.O. and is current as of March 30th, 2019. 
Figure 1:  
Name of 
Bill or 
Executive 
Order 
Bill or E.O. 
Classification 
Who 
Created the 
Bill or 
Executive 
Order? 
What gets 
Establishe
d?  
Definitions of 
AI Technology: 
Who is 
Conducting 
Research? 
Purposes of 
the Bill 
How 
often 
Officials 
Meet 
The Future 
of Artificial 
Intelligence 
Act of 2017 
H.R. 4625 & 
S. 2217 (Joint 
bills 
introduced in 
House and 
Senate) 
House 
Committees:  
Energy & 
Commerce, 
Science, 
Space, and 
The 
Federal 
Advisory 
Committee 
on the 
Developm
Systems that 
“think” and “act” 
like humans; 
systems that can 
perform rational 
reasoning, 
Voting 
members on 
policy 
discussion: 5 
members 
from 
Promote 
greater 
economic and 
information 
security while 
developing AI 
Virtually
: At least 
once 
every 
two 
months. 
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Technology, 
Education & 
Workforce, 
Foreign 
Affairs, 
Judiciary, 
Oversight & 
Government 
Reform.  
Senate 
Committees: 
Commerce, 
Science, and 
Transportati
on 
ent and 
Implement
ation of 
Artificial 
Intelligenc
e  
advanced 
cognitive, 
emotional, and 
social behaviors; 
distinguishes 
between 
“general” and 
“narrow” AI 
academic & 
research 
community; 
6 members 
from private 
industry (at 
least 1 must 
represent 
small 
business 
interests); 6 
members 
from civil 
rights or 
social 
groups; 2 
from labor 
organization
s. Non-
voting 
members: 
general input 
from the 
Federal 
Trade 
Commission, 
Department 
of 
Education, 
Department 
of Labor, & 
National 
Science 
Foundation 
is allowed.  
 
technology; 
protect data 
privacy; 
promote 
economic and 
social 
stability 
In-
person: 
At least 
twice a 
year 
The 
National 
Security 
Commissio
n on 
Artificial 
Intelligence 
Act of 2018 
H.R. 5356 House 
Committees: 
Armed 
Services, 
Education & 
the 
Workforce, 
Foreign 
Affairs, 
Science, 
Space & 
Technology, 
and Energy 
& 
Commerce 
The 
National 
Security 
Commissi
on on 
Artificial 
Intelligenc
e 
Any artificial 
system that can 
perform tasks 
without 
significant 
human oversight, 
can “learn from 
experience,” 
display human 
like cognition 
planning 
learning 
communication, 
uses machine-
learning 
techniques 
3 people 
appointed by 
the Secretary 
of Defense; 
4 members 
chosen by 
officials of 
the 
Committee 
on Armed 
Services of 
the House; 4 
members 
chosen by 
officials of 
the 
Committee 
on Armed 
Services of 
the Senate 
Review 
advances in 
AI technology 
pertaining to 
machine 
learning, data 
security and 
privacy, 
national 
security and 
foreign 
affairs, etc. 
Not 
specified 
The AI In 
Governmen
t Act of 
2018 
S. 3502 Senate 
Committees 
on 
Homeland 
Security and 
An 
Emerging 
Technolog
y Policy 
Lab within 
Not provided The 
Administrato
r, the 
Secretary of 
Commerce, 
Establish a 
policy lab that 
monitors AI 
issues 
pertaining to 
At least 
once a 
year 
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Government
al Affairs  
 
the 
General 
Service 
Administra
tion 
1 member 
each from 
the 
following 
groups: The 
Office of 
Science & 
Technology 
Policy; The 
Office of 
Management 
& Budget; 
The 
Department 
of 
Commerce;  
4 members 
picked from 
other federal 
agencies; 8 
members 
designated 
by the 
Administrato
r & 
Secretary of 
Commerce 
who will be 
appointed 
fresh every 6 
months. 
Division of 
these 8 
members: 4 
from 
relevant 
industries; 2 
representativ
es of higher 
education; 2 
from public 
interest 
groups 
representing 
privacy and 
civil liberties 
issues 
 
public safety. 
Will regularly 
convene 
members 
from federal 
agencies and 
laboratories, 
non-profits, 
educational 
institutions, 
etc. to advise 
the federal 
government 
on AI issues. 
This bill 
mentions 
addressing 
both policy, 
legal, and 
ethical 
challenges  
 
E.O. 
Maintaining 
American 
Leadership 
in Artificial 
Intelligence 
N.A.  
Date signed: 
02/11/2019 
President 
Donald J. 
Trump 
No new 
committee 
or policy 
lab 
established
. The 
Select 
Committee 
on 
Artificial 
Intelligenc
e (created 
May 2018) 
Federal 
investments in 
AI relating to 
R&D or core 
techniques & 
technologies; 
prototype 
systems; 
application and 
adaptation of AI 
techniques; 
architectural and 
systems support 
Heads of all 
agencies 
shall review 
their federal 
data, models, 
& AI 
projects to 
increase 
access/use 
for the non-
federal 
community  
Drive AI 
R&D in the 
U.S. to 
promote 
national 
security, 
economic 
competitivene
ss, and 
scientific 
discovery. 
Support 
innovation & 
Not 
specified 
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under the 
National 
Science 
and 
Technolog
y Council 
(NSTC) 
will 
coordinate 
AI R&D 
discussion-
s between 
federal 
agencies 
for AI; and 
cyberinfrastructu
re, data sets, and 
standards for AI; 
and open data 
open markets 
for American 
AI industries. 
Promote 
policy 
collaboration 
across 
industry, 
academia, 
international 
partners & 
allies, non-
federal 
entities 
 
 Of all the bills that have been introduced to initiate regulatory discussions for AI 
technology, the Future of Artificial Intelligence Act of 2017 eliminates at least some 
jurisdictional barriers between the House and Senate by establishing a centralized 
committee for addressing economic, social, and technological policy issues pertaining to 
AI technology. The creation of an “AI-specific” committee would help combat the 
decentralized nature of congressional policymaking by convening federal lawmakers 
under one committee to facilitate AI policy discussions. More significantly, the Act 
ensures that technical expertise will be directly incorporated into the policymaking 
process by calling for “voting members” of the new congressional committee to include 
officials from academia, industry, and technological research organizations. This bill’s 
emphasis on incorporating S&T industry officials’ policy opinions into the federal 
legislative process will help compensate for congressional officials’ lack of foresight for 
anticipating technological innovation and may also help combat partisan pressures faced 
by traditional, federal lawmakers.9 Simultaneously, this bill balances industry input with 
federal policymaking expertise by calling for officials from federal S&T-related agencies 
                                                           
9 I am assuming that members of the S&T industry will be more likely to represent science, technology, 
and business interests than partisan ones while serving on the committee. In this sense, they may provide 
policy insight that is less influenced by partisan interests.  
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to provide policy input as “non-voting” members of the committee. The incorporation of 
federal officials as “non-voting” members is beneficial because industry officials and 
federal lawmakers would still possess access to additional political expertise, as 
necessary, while developing policy initiatives. 
 In addition to providing technical expertise, S&T industry officials who would be 
appointed to the new congressional committee would also be able to provide federal 
lawmakers with insight with respect to how policy initiatives may differently impact 
small and large industry. S&T industry officials could use their technical insight to guide 
policymakers in writing regulatory policies in manners that do not stifle public and 
private enterprise’s ability to conduct technological research or innovate new 
technologies.  
 Finally, the Future of Artificial Intelligence Act of 2017 states that members of 
the new AI policy committee would possess the authority to establish additional, smaller 
“sub-committees” for addressing specific AI policy issues, as they see fit. This authority 
would enable members of the primary committee to further organize regulatory 
discussions pertaining AI technology by granting them the ability to establish additional 
policy committees for either regulating specific AI technologies, or addressing specific 
technological issues as they emerge10.  
 While this bill seems promising for its attempt to integrate scientists’ and 
                                                           
10 For example, if new issues concerning data privacy with respect to autonomous vehicles emerge, a 
separate subcommittee may be established under The Federal Advisory Committee on the Development 
and Implementation of Artificial Intelligence to specifically address those concerns. As new AI 
technologies are constantly being developed, and it is increasingly difficult to predict all potential 
difficulties with new AI technologies, committee members’ abilities to establish subcommittees for 
addressing specific policy issues may help keep policy discourse more organized. Subcommittees may be 
created by appointing industry officials who are even more specialized for specific policy concerns. 
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engineers’ technological expertise directly into the federal law-making process, all 
political and technological officials of the committee will still be appointed by the 
Secretary of Commerce, which is an inherently political position. As a political authority, 
there is potential for the Secretary of Commerce to appoint officials according to select 
partisan interests, which may oppose the Act’s purpose to incorporate politically-neutral, 
scientific expertise into policy discussions. There is potential for committee 
officials to be disproportionately appointed based off federal interests 11 in comparison to 
concerns among the scientific and technological communities12.  
 An additional concern of this bill is that it only requires that one voting member 
of the proposed committee be an official who represents the technological interests of 
“small businesses.” As small and large companies, both technologically-oriented and not, 
have significantly different needs pertaining to technological innovation and profits, it is 
not necessarily balanced that only one member of the committee be representative of 
small business’ economic and technological interests. To better ensure that policy 
initiatives do not inhibit smaller business’ abilities to conduct technological research or 
collect profits, there should be a numerical balance of three large, private technological 
industry and three small private technological industry officials present on the committee. 
This would better protect smaller business interests from being  
                                                           
11 Potentially, with respect to constituents’ interests as well, assuming that federal policymakers consider 
the concerns of their citizens when selecting S&T policy issues to address.  
12 This statement assumes that members of the scientific and engineering communities disclose their 
scientific and technological concerns with federal authorities. As explained earlier in this report, members 
of the S&T community are sometimes hesitant to disclose their own personal research, or technological 
concerns in fear that government action may stifle their abilities to innovate, or in fear that disclosing their 
research may diminish its competitiveness.  
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overshadowed by the needs of larger S&T businesses and corporations.13  
 Aside from the bill’s proposal for balancing small and large business interests, the 
most significant flaw pertaining to the committees’ composition is that the bill doesn’t 
require members of the committee to address how to rectify legal concerns pertaining to 
emerging AI technologies. Likewise, the bill does not mandate that the Secretary of 
Commerce appoint legal experts to the committee as either voting members, or non-
voting members, which stifles the integration of legal expertise into the federal 
policymaking process. As a significant issue pertaining to all forms of AI technology is 
that current legal doctrine is ill-equipped for attributing liability, negligence, and 
criminality to non-human entities, it is problematic that this bill does not suggest how to 
address these issues.  
 Moreover, legislative difficulties may also arise based off how the Future of 
Artificial Intelligence Act of 2017 proposes that congressional policymakers receive the 
policy suggestions that are created by the committee. According to the bill, all policy 
proposals and reports generated by the proposed committee are to be submitted to the 
Secretary of Commerce for review, prior to being delivered to congressional staff. The 
Secretary of Commerce is responsible for interpreting policy proposals suggested by the 
committee, revising them, and narrowing policy interests before congressional officials 
receive the reports. Under these parameters, there is potential for partisan interests to 
impact the Secretary of Commerce’s review of the committee’s proposals. This would be 
problematic if the proposals that congressional staff receive contain different policy  
                                                           
13 On a related note, as technological innovation and advancement in AI technology is constant, it should be 
considered that voting members of S&T industry be replaced at least biannually so that those who serve on 
the committee possess the appropriate expertise for addressing emerging technological issues.  
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information and initiatives than what committee members had intended to convey.14  
 Unlike the Future of Artificial Intelligence Act of 2017, the National Security 
Commission on Artificial Intelligence Act of 2018 is better designed for addressing 
issues concerning AI technology, national security, and foreign affairs due to its emphasis 
that regulatory policy research be conducted by the House and Senate Armed Services 
committees. However, it is highly problematic that this bill does not specify who would 
be appointed for commission on the bill’s proposed committee, the National Security 
Commission on Artificial Intelligence. According to the text of this bill, it is not 
mandatory that the Secretary of Defense and Armed Services Committees appoint 
members of academia, technological industry and research, or legal professionals to the 
commission to discuss regulatory policies for AI technology. Therefore, the officials who 
would be appointed to the commission may not possess appropriate technical expertise 
for effectively integrating S&T industry perspective into the policymaking process, or for 
combatting congressional authorities’ lack of technical knowledge and partisan interests. 
This is particularly problematic because there is no guarantee that AI policy discussions 
will be held with respect to legal and scientific concerns, in addition to partisan concerns. 
Moreover, as appointed officials are required to serve on the commission for the duration 
of its life, there are no opportunities under this bill to replace commission officials if 
different technical expertise were required to address emerging technological issues.   
 While the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence Act of 2018 
fails to ensure that S&T industry and legal expertise would be incorporated into the 
                                                           
14 If future congressional policy discussions are based off information that does not accurately represent the 
committee’s policy interests, there is potential for future, proposed congressional policy to misrepresent the 
policy initiatives of the committee. 
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federal policymaking process, The AI in Government Act of 2018 proposes the 
establishment of an extensive policy lab for addressing AI policy issues. This bill 
proposes that all AI policy discussions that are currently being conducted under the 
Executive and Legislative branches be centralized under a new “Emerging Technology 
Policy Lab” within the General Services Administration. The Lab would comprise of 
S&T industry experts, members of higher education, public interest groups, congressional 
authorities, and members of federal S&T agencies to discuss AI policy issues. The direct 
incorporation of academic and industry expertise in this Lab would help circumvent the 
common S&T policymaking barrier that congressional authorities lack technical expertise 
and training for anticipating technological innovation. More importantly, this bill also 
specifies that members of the Lab must address legal challenges pertaining to emerging 
AI technologies to begin establishing legal precedents for courts to refer to when AI 
technologies cause technological, political, or social damages. A final strength of this bill 
is that it suggests that members of the Lab be replaced biannually to ensure that the Lab’s 
policy researchers possess appropriate expertise for addressing timely, AI-specific issues. 
 Unfortunately, while the AI in Government Act of 2018 aims to address both 
legal and technical concerns pertaining to AI technology, it does not mandate that legal 
experts be appointed to the policy lab. It is contradictory that the bill mandates that the 
policy lab address legal concerns regarding AI technology, yet not mandate that legal 
expertise be directly incorporated into the policy research process. This contradiction 
raises several difficulties, as it implies that S&T industry officials, congressional 
authorities, and members of federal agencies will collectively attempt to establish legal 
precedent for AI technology without direct consultation with legal experts. This is 
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especially dangerous if S&T industry officials lack legal and political expertise in a 
similar capacity that congressional authorities have historically lacked technical expertise 
when forming legislation. Although this bill proposes that officials of federal S&T 
agencies also be appointed to the policy lab to contribute to regulatory discussions, 
members of federal agencies are also subject to influence by partisan interests like 
congressional authorities, and therefore may also fail to objectively assess legal issues 
pertaining to emerging AI technologies.  
 Like the AI in Government Act of 2018, President Trump’s new E.O. implies that 
it is necessary for the federal government to begin addressing legal issues concerning AI 
technology. However, the E.O. uniquely asserts that it is necessary to begin creating 
federal standards for testing emerging AI technologies prior to their implementation to 
augment technological security and stability for consumers. Although it is unreasonable 
to assume that uniform testing standards may be applied to all types of AI technologies 
being designed for the market, and for all AI technologies that are currently employed in 
different environments, the E.O. is beneficial because it acknowledges that testing 
procedures create significant security risks for emerging technologies. This Order implies 
that the standardization of “testing procedures” for AI technologies may be used to begin 
establishing legal framework for such systems.15 The E.O. alludes to achieving this by 
facilitating communication between the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
and the Trump Administration’s Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence to further 
                                                           
15 The concept is as follows: if there are federal standards for safe testing of machine-learning technologies, 
and a company or individual developer fails to adhere to those standards, then legally, the federal testing 
standards may establish precedent that the company or developer is liable for the behavior/action taken by 
the AI system. “Uniform” testing standards may be utilized as a base for assigning liability to 
circumstances in which AI systems cause technological, political, or social harms. Over time, standards 
may become more specified for specific technologies and circumstances. 
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coordinate policy discussions between federal S&T agencies, public and private 
enterprise, and higher-education institutions. Moreover, this order is also beneficial 
because it constitutes an intergovernmental action: it is designed to foster communication 
between both federal and non-federal agencies to generate AI policy suggestions, so that 
congressional authorities may access both technical and legal expertise when creating 
policy proposals.   
 Unfortunately, while this this Order integrates non-political perspective into the 
policymaking process, it does not express whether the Select Committee on Artificial 
Intelligence may create additional subcommittees. As one of the primary aims of this 
Order is to create testing standards for emerging AI technologies, it would be useful if the 
Committee were able to establish subcommittees to further organize policy discussions 
toward establishing testing standards that are tailored for application to specific of 
emerging, machine-learning technologies16.  
 Lastly, this Order does not specify how policy initiatives and reports generated by 
the Committee should be conveyed to Congress. Perhaps Congressional communication 
is less an emphasis in this document because it is an Executive Order, rather than a bill 
that has been introduced to the House or Senate floor. If this is the case, then this Order is 
useful for its ability to orchestrate intergovernmental policy discussions between the 
Executive and Congressional branches and S&T industry sources but is not as useful for 
organizing policy discussion within Congress directly.  
                                                           
16 For example: A subcommittee consisting of S&T industry experts who are familiar with autonomous 
vehicles, congressional authorities, and legal experts could be assimilated specifically to discuss how to 
establish testing standards for autonomous vehicles. A similar subcommittee could also be established to 
discuss testing standards for search engine algorithms, or for “smart-technology” (like Amazon’s Alexa).   
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 In sum, the above discussed congressional bills and President Trump’s Executive 
Order are insightful because they provide direction for how federal and non-federal actors 
may be aggregated into centralized policy entities for addressing AI regulatory issues. 
The above legislative documents further demonstrate that congressional authorities and 
members of federal agencies acknowledge that they must consult with legal and S&T 
industry experts to create comprehensive regulatory policies. However, a common theme 
among all the above discussed legislation is that even when S&T industry officials and 
legal experts are incorporated into policy debate, there is no guarantee to what extent 
their input will be incorporated into final policy products.  
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Findings: What Does Federal Action Necessitate? 
 The previous section of this paper discusses the benefits and drawbacks of 
recently proposed Congressional bills and President Trump’s new, AI-oriented E.O. to 
explore how federal lawmakers are currently addressing AI policy issues. My analysis 
emphasizes how federal policymakers are currently incorporating, or failing to 
incorporate, S&T industry and legal expertise into federal policy discussions. In this 
section, I refer to the above discussed congressional bills and President Trump’s E.O. to 
suggest how federal policy discussions pertaining to AI technology should be conducted 
going forward, with specific suggestions for ensuring that S&T industry and legal 
expertise are incorporated into and utilized in the policymaking process.  
 First, as demonstrated in the legislative motions discussed above, federal 
lawmakers should continue to define AI technology broadly in future policy proposals. 
Collectively, the three congressional policies and President Trump’s E.O. identify 
technologies as being artificially intelligent when they can “think rationally, process 
emotional reasoning, maintain cognitive awareness,” “when they are designed to be 
machine-learning technologies and systems,” and when they can “operate without human 
oversight.” As new AI technologies are constantly being developed and introduced to the 
market, it is beneficial that the above legislative documents provide broad criteria for 
defining AI technology because overly restrictive definitions may become inappropriate 
or obsolete with the development of new technologies. I realize that earlier sections of 
this paper demonstrate that the presence of ambiguous language in federal policies may 
pose issues for interpretation and reinforcement among federal courts and agencies, as 
seen with the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and in the 1930 Plant Patent Act. 
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However, narrow, restrictive criteria for identifying AI technology would be problematic 
for the courts because it they could potentially limit the scope of cases regarding AI 
systems that courts could review. Definitions for AI technology must remain broad in 
future federal policy proposals to continue accommodating future changes in innovation.  
 As demonstrated in the recently introduced congressional bills and the new 
Executive Order, future AI policies should also continue to suggest that members of 
Congress and federal agencies be aggregated into centralized policy entities, while 
simultaneously decentralizing policymaking authority to include legal experts and S&T 
industry officials in the legislative process. A centralized congressional committee should 
be established to conduct future AI policy discussions because it would help circumvent 
jurisdictional issues that have historically arisen between the House and Senate when 
federal lawmakers attempt to determine which authorities should be responsible for 
addressing specific S&T issues17.  
 Future federal policies regarding regulations for AI technology must also mandate 
collaboration between federal lawmakers, S&T industry officials, and legal experts to 
begin creating comprehensive regulatory policies, especially in relation to legal concerns 
regarding AI systems. Federal lawmakers must consult with S&T industry officials and 
legal experts throughout the policymaking process to gain access to the necessary 
technical and legal expertise for creating federal policies that anticipate and can 
                                                           
17 The procedures of federal policymaking in the United States will most likely always inhibit the pace of 
establishing new congressional policies, as the American political system was purposely designed under the 
Constitution to be resistant swift changes. However, the creation of a centralized committee for discussing 
AI-specific policy issues would help expedite the pace of the federal policymaking process by diminishing 
at least some jurisdictional barriers that traditionally arise between House and Senate committees.  
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accommodate technological innovation 18. S&T officials and legal experts can also 
provide federal policymakers with guidance in establishing how policies should be 
implemented, and who should be responsible for reinforcing them 19. Finally, S&T and 
legal officials may provide non-partisan voices in the policymaking procedure and can 
use their insight to help diminish or mediate partisan conflicts between federal 
officials20.  
 However, as has been explored in earlier sections of this paper, even when S&T 
industry officials and legal experts are directly incorporated into the federal policymaking 
procedure, there is no guarantee to what extent their input will be incorporated into final 
policy products. The manners in which federal policy proposals are reviewed and revised 
prior to being distributed to Congressional staff may negatively impact how much 
industry and legal expertise is included within final versions of policy proposals. Future 
AI regulatory policies should consider eliminating third-party review of committees’ (or 
commissions’) policy proposals before they are distributed to Congressional staff. This 
would help mitigate the potential for S&T industry officials’ and legal experts’ policy 
suggestions to be misinterpreted or misrepresented when proposals are official distributed 
to members of Congress.  
                                                           
18 This is necessary to ensure that legislation remains useful, long-term. Lack of consideration of 
technological innovation when a bill is being written can potentially lead to a bill becoming obsolete not 
long after it is enacted. 
19 Usually, Congress tasks federal agencies with reinforcing specific legislation. In this case, S&T and legal 
experts may be able to assist congressional authorities in determining which federal agencies are 
appropriate for overseeing the implementation of AI related policies (in addition to the court system, when 
applicable).  
20 It is necessary for congressional officials to consider the social and political implications of policy 
proposals. Although congressional authorities often lack technical expertise when proposing S&T 
legislation, their input is still invaluable because S&T and legal officials often lack the political expertise 
that federal officials possess. However, when partisan conflicts stifle the pace of the legislative process, 
S&T and legal officials may offer non-partisan insight that mitigates those disputes.   
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 Future federal AI policies must also address how to assign legal liability, 
negligence and criminality under circumstances where AI systems cause physical, 
political, or social damages. As explained by the AI in Government Act of 2018 and E.O. 
13859, standardized testing regulations for AI technology may begin providing courts 
with legal precedent for identifying responsibility in cases concerning misbehaviors or 
malfunctions of such technologies21. However, to create such “baseline” standards, 
federal authorities must regularly consult with S&T industry entities that possess 
experience in research and development projects of AI systems, and possess extensive 
experience in assessing the technological complexities of such systems. The table below 
displays technological industry and non-profit organizations that specifically conduct 
both technological and legal AI policy research pertaining to data transparency and 
privacy. These organizations’ research projects and policy initiatives could contribute to 
the federal legislative process by providing extensive technical expertise that may help 
guide federal officials on how to approach establishing regulatory standards for AI testing 
and stability. Federal authorities should review these organizations’ technological policy 
research and consider appointing officials of these organizations to future AI 
congressional committees and policy labs. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
21 Testing standards that are specific to certain types of AI systems could also be developed over time. 
However, it will most likely be necessary to establish baseline testing standards before such standards 
could be further specialized between technologies.  
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Figure Two:  
Organizati
on Name 
Organizati
on Type 
Domestic 
or 
Internatio
nal in 
Nature 
Type of 
Product 
or 
Services 
Offered 
Example of 
Technologica
l or AI Policy 
Research 
Combined 
Example of 
Technological or 
AI Policy Research 
Combined 
Example of 
Technologic
al or AI 
Policy 
Research 
Combined 
Past 
Experience 
Collaborati
ng with 
Federal 
Governmen
t 
BSA: The 
Software 
Alliance 
A Trade 
association 
[22] 22 
Domestic 
and 
Internation
al [22] 
Develops 
complianc
e 
programs 
for legal 
software 
use and 
develops 
technologi
cal 
regulatory 
policy 
ideas that 
safely 
promote 
innovation 
[22] 
Conducts 
research for 
creating 
flexible data 
policies that 
support 
transparency 
and 
technological 
innovation in 
the public and 
private sectors 
23[23] 
Wants to establish 
policy standards for 
developing 
workforce training 
programs regarding 
AI usage. Launched 
"transformyourtrade
.org" to centralize 
information on 
current AI training 
programs available 
to the public 24[24] 
Research 
demonstrates 
that 
"umbrella" 
regulations 
are not 
appropriate 
for managing 
AI 
technologies 
that are 
utilized in 
different 
environment
s 25[25] 
Yes. 
Collaborates 
with federal 
officials. i.e. 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
and 
Committee 
on Science, 
Space and 
Technology 
26[26] 
Informatio
n 
Technolog
y & 
Innovation 
Foundation 
Independe
nt, non-
profit and 
non-
partisan 
research 
and 
educational 
institute 
27[27] 
Domestic 
and 
internation
al [27] 
 
Conducts 
research 
for setting 
policy 
suggestion
s 
regarding 
technologi
cal 
innovation 
and 
politics 
[27] 
Conducts 
research for 
developing 
policies that 
would 
mandate 
federal 
agencies to 
disclose 
security flaws, 
and 
collaborate 
with private 
agencies to fix 
them 28[28] 
Conducts research 
for how private 
industry officials 
may be incorporated 
into federal cyber-
security projects. 
[28] (This is 
relatively new) 
Researches 
how federal 
policies can 
be created to 
mandate the 
reporting of 
information-
security 
practices by 
companies to 
increase 
transparency 
with 
consumers 
[28] 
Yes. 
Research 
officials 
have prior 
experience 
in 
collaboratin
g with 
federal and 
international 
policymaker
s for 
technologica
l regulations 
[27] 
Internet 
Associatio
n 
A trade 
association 
29[29] 
Domestic 
and 
Internation
al [29] 
Serves as 
a medium 
for 
representi
ng Internet 
companies 
on matters 
Conducts 
research 
regarding how 
companies 
may increase 
transparency 
with 
Promotes regulatory 
policy ideas that 
will unify federal 
and state data 
policies. This would 
make it easier for 
companies to ensure 
Researches 
how 
regulations 
may be 
established 
that allow 
individuals 
Yes. 
Located in 
Washington, 
D.C. 
Internet 
Association 
officials 
                                                           
22
 BSA: The Software Alliance (n.d.). About BSA. Retrived from https://www.bsa.org/about-bsa 
23
 BSA: The Software Alliance (n.d.). BSA policy overview. Retrieved from 
 https://www.bsa.org/~/media/Files/Policy/BSA_2018_AI_PolicyOverview.pdf 
24
 BSA: The Software Alliance (n.d.). (2018, September 27). Politico AI Summit. [Television Broadcast of Summit]. 2:37-5:15. 
Retrieved from https://www.bsa.org/news-and-events/events/2018/september/politico-ai-summit 
 
25
 BSA: The Software Alliance (n.d.). Building confidence & trust in artificial intelligence systems. Retrieved from 
 https://ai.bsa.org/building-confidence-trust-in-artificial-intelligence-systems/ 
26
 BSA: The Software Alliance (n.d.). AI summit: Investing in innovation and tomorrow's workforce. Retrieved from 
 https://www.bsa.org/news-and-events/events/2018/july/aisummitjuly2018 
27
 Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (n.d.). About ITIF: A Champion for innovation. Retrieved from 
 https://itif.org/about 
28
 Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (n.d.). Tech policy to-do list.  
 Retrieved from https://itif.org/tech-policy-to-do-list 
29
 Internet Association (n.d.). Our members. Retrieved from https://internetassociation.org/ 
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of public 
policy, 
web 
security 
and data 
manageme
nt [29] 
consumers 
regarding 
their 
information-
security 
practices, and 
how their 
personal data 
is collected 
and used 
30[30] 
that their technology 
complies with 
existing regulations 
[30] 
to access 
their 
personal data 
that gets 
collected by 
companies, 
without such 
practices 
jeopardizing 
exposing 
other 
individuals' 
personal 
information 
[30] 
converse 
with federal 
policymaker
s regarding 
proposed 
technologica
l bills [29] 
Microsoft Corporatio
n and 
technology 
organizatio
n 31[31] 
Domestic 
and 
Internation
al [31] 
Develops 
and 
creates 
computer 
technologi
es and 
software 
[31] 
Conducts 
research for 
developing 
legal policy 
recommendati
ons for "The 
Cloud" 32[32] 
Microsoft research 
experts have 
published The 
Future Computed: 
Artificial 
intelligence and its 
role in society (a 
guide) detailing 
principles for safe 
development and 
use of AI 
technology [32] 
Researches 
how to 
increase 
transparency 
between 
industry and 
consumers 
regarding 
data 
collection 
practices 
[32] 
Yes. The 
Regulatory 
and Public 
Policy 
Committee 
of the 
Microsoft 
Board of 
Directors is 
responsible 
for 
communicat
ing with 
policymaker
s regarding 
technologica
l policy 
issues [32] 
 
Niskanen 
Center 
Non-
partisan 
think tank 
33[33] 
Domestic 
[33] 
Develops 
policy 
proposals 
to present 
to federal 
legislators 
[33] 
Unusual: 
More focused 
on 20th 
century 
legislative 
perspectives. 
Supports 
regulations 
that set 
standards for 
autonomous 
vehicles and 
IoT 34[34] 
Research proposes 
less privacy 
regulations for the 
development of AI 
technology [34] 
 
Created the 
Policymaker'
s Guide to 
Emerging 
Technologies 
to assist 
federal 
legislators in 
creating 
policy that 
doesn't stifle 
innovation 
but 
encourages it 
to better 
anticipate 
innovation/ra
pid 
technological 
change. 
35[35] See 
Yes. 
Officials of 
the 
Niskanen 
Center 
directly 
communicat
e with 
federal 
legislative 
and 
executive 
officials 
[33] 
                                                           
30
 Internet Association (n.d.). Policy position: Privacy. Retrieved from https://internetassociation.org/positions/privacy/ 
31
 Microsoft (n.d.). (Home page). Retrieved from https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/ 
32
 Microsoft (n.d.). Public policy engagement. Retrieved from  
 https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/corporate-responsibility/public-policy-engagement 
33
 Niskanen Center (n.d.). About. Retrieved from https://niskanencenter.org/about/ 
34
 Niskanen Center (n.d.). Policy: Technology. Retrieved from https://niskanencenter.org/blog/policies/panopticontra/ 
35
 Hagemann, R. (2018). The Policymaker's guide to emerging technologies. Niskanen Center. Retrieved from 
 https://niskanencenter.org/blog/the-policymakers-guide-to-emerging-technologies/ 
55 
Source 36[35] 
for more 
information 
R Street 
Institute 
Non-profit, 
non-
partisan, 
public 
policy 
research 
organizatio
n 37[37] 
Domestic 
[37] 
Conducts 
policy 
research 
that 
supports 
free 
markets 
and 
limited 
governme
nt [37] 
Research 
supports ideas 
that Congress 
should reduce 
barriers to use 
of AI 
technology in 
the supply of 
labor, the 
supply of 
data, and 
access to 
technological 
hardware 
38[38] 
Research indicates 
that the federal 
government should 
be more transparent 
with the public 
regarding 
technological 
capability and 
government 
collection/usage of 
personal data [38] 
 
Research 
demonstrates 
a need for 
increased 
international 
transparency 
on AI 
marketing 
and usage 
between 
federal and 
international 
policymakers 
[38] 
Yes. 
Produces 
research for 
and 
facilitates 
communicat
ion with 
federal and 
state 
policymaker
s [37] 
IBM Corporatio
n and 
technology 
organizatio
n 39[39] 
Domestic 
and 
Internation
al [39] 
Develops 
and 
creates 
computer 
technologi
es for 
different 
settings. 
Also 
conducts 
policy 
research 
[39] 
Researches 
security 
threats 
associated 
with deep-
learning AI 
technology 
and data 
collection. 
40[40] 
Researches methods 
for improving AI 
security by 
strengthen 
preemptive 
measures for data 
collection and 
distribution 41[41] 
Develops 
software 
security 
techniques 
for 
protecting AI 
technologies 
from security 
breaches/atta
cks 42[42] 
Yes. The 
IBM 
Government 
and 
Regulatory 
Affairs is a 
global 
corporate 
function that 
facilitates 
communicat
ion between 
IBM 
officials and 
federal and 
international 
policymaker
s. The 
purpose of 
the group is 
to provide 
guidance on 
technologica
l policy 
issues 43[43] 
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 Federal authorities should consider collaborating with members of the 
technological organizations, trade associations, and non-profit institutions represented in 
the table above because they all possess prior experience in collaborating with the federal 
government on S&T policy issues. Officials from BSA: The Software Alliance (BSA) 
possess prior experience communicating with members of the Chamber of Commerce 
and Committee on Science, Space and Technology with respect to policy discussions for 
data security and emerging technologies (“AI Summit…”, n.d.). Officials from the 
Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) and the Internet Association 
(IA) have also collaborated with congressional authorities and federal agencies in the past 
to assess how different developing technologies will impact personal data privacy, and 
social and economic spheres of life (“About ITIF”, n.d.) (“Our Members”, n.d.)44. 
Similarly, members of the Niskanen Center and R Street Institute have experience in 
proposing policy regulations to federal authorities for autonomous vehicles and for 
suggesting how to improve data transparency between the federal government and the 
public (“About”, n.d.)  (“About R Street”, n.d.). Microsoft has its own Regulatory and 
Public Policy Committee under the Microsoft Board of Directors to orchestrate 
communication between technological developers at Microsoft and federal policymakers 
with respect to developing technology policy issues (“Public policy engagement”, n.d.), 
and IBM has an “IBM Government and Regulatory Affairs” sector that is designed to 
                                                           
44 The IA is also interested in reforming federal data security laws to increase transparency between the 
federal government and the public, and between public and private companies and the public. Additionally, 
the IA also conducts policy research to determine how to better unify federal and state data privacy policies 
(“Our Members”, n.d.). This report will not further discuss relationship between data privacy laws at the 
federal and state levels.  
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foster communication between IBM officials and federal and international policymakers 
(“Worldwide public policy…”, n.d.).  
 The significance of these organizations’ past experiences in collaborating with 
federal policymakers is that they all have prior exposure to the federal policymaking 
procedure in the United States, and likely have all been exposed to how partisan interests 
may influence the direction and framing of federal S&T policies in the United States. 
Therefore, these organizations’ officials should be directly incorporated into federal 
policy discussions for AI technology because they possess former experience in 
representing S&T industry interests in the presence of partisan disputes. Moreover, these 
industry officials may serve as non-partisan, mediating forces when partisan interests 
inhibit the administrative pace of the federal policymaking procedure.  
 In addition to possessing prior experience in collaborating with the federal 
government, officials of the organizations included within Figure Two could also provide 
federal legislators with insight on how to begin establishing regulatory standards for the 
testing of AI technologies. Of the organizations included within the above table, officials 
from BSA and ITIF, specifically, may offer federal policymakers the most 
comprehensive technical insight for designing testing standards for AI technologies 
(“About BSA”, n.d.) (“About ITIF”, n.d.). Policy research projects from both 
organizations conclude that it is not be feasible to establish a uniform testing standards 
that are appropriate for application to all types of AI technologies because machine-
learning systems are too diverse, can behave unpredictably, and are employed in vastly 
different environments (“Building confidence…”, n.d.) (“Tech policy…”, n.d.). 
However, BSA and ITIF both support the development of at least some federal testing 
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standards for AI technology (broadly) to provide public and private companies with 
organized guidance for verifying and improving the stability and security of their 
machine-learning systems before they are officially implemented (“The Software 
Alliance Hearing…”, 2017) (“Tech policy…”, n.d.). BSA and ITIF, alone, do not 
comprise all industry and non-profit organizations that are currently conducting policy 
research for establishing testing standards for emerging AI technologies. However, BSA 
and ITIF serve as two sample organizations with extensive experience in conducting 
technological policy research, which may be used to assist federal legislators and legal 
experts in writing future AI regulatory policies.45  
 Finally, federal authorities should consider collaborating with officials from the 
organizations listed in Figure two because they conduct policy research that emphasizes 
how to balance public and private interests, as well as large and small business interests 
when designing regulatory policies for emerging AI technologies. BSA, specifically, 
supports the creation of a flexible policy framework that will enable all types and sizes of 
businesses to flourish (“BSA Policy Overview,” n.d.). Officials from Microsoft and IBM 
may also provide federal policymakers with insight as to how legislation may potentially 
impact large and small business interests, as Microsoft and IBM are large technological 
corporations. Although I have primarily asserted the necessity for establishing legal 
framework for AI technologies throughout this paper, federal authorities must still 
consider the impacts of future regulatory policies on different types of businesses. This is 
                                                           
45 Officials from BSA and ITIF, specifically, possess experience in facilitating both technological research 
and technological policy research. In this sense, any collaborations between federal officials, legal experts, 
and officials from BSA and ITIF would be unique because all parties possess experience in writing and 
conducting policy research (although legal experts are more likely to be accustomed with conducting 
legally-focused research).  
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because small and large S&T business innovate and collect profits at different paces, and 
it would be unfair if future regulatory policies disproportionately benefitted or damaged 
different scales of businesses.   
 Overall, this section utilizes past AI legislation that has been introduced to 
Congress and President Trump’s recent E.O. as framework for making suggestions as to 
how federal lawmakers should begin developing and establishing AI regulatory policies 
in the future. Past legislative motions demonstrate that future AI policies should continue 
to define AI technology broadly to accommodate future changes in technological 
innovation, and to provide courts with flexibility in identifying AI technology between 
cases. Additionally, future legislation should also continue to aggregate members of 
Congress and S&T federal agencies into centralized policy entities to facilitate organized 
communication across the Executive and Legislative branches for regulating AI 
technology. Simultaneously, such centralized policymaking bodies must extend 
membership to non-federal entities, such as officials of S&T industry and legal experts, 
to provide federal lawmakers with non-partisan, technical and legal expertise when 
writing regulatory policies. The direct incorporation of non-federal perspective into the 
policymaking process will help compensate for congressional authorities’ general lack of 
technical expertise and will help diminish partisan conflicts between federal officials.  
 Lastly, federal authorities must collaborate with non-federal entities to discuss the 
potential for establishing testing standards for AI technologies prior to their 
implementation. The establishment of standardized testing guidelines for AI technology 
would help combat current challenges in American legal doctrine by providing courts 
with baseline precedents for identifying legal liability and criminality in cases concerning 
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damages caused by AI technologies. Figure two displays technological industry and non-
profit organizations that possess experience in conducting policy research for establishing 
testing procedures for AI technology. I recommend that federal authorities appoint 
officials of these organizations to future policy committees and commissions to ensure 
that S&T policy interests, technical expertise, and legal knowledge are utilized in 
addressing AI policy issues.  
 Unfortunately, while these suggestions may help combat congressional 
authorities’ lack of technical training and will provide greater regulatory guidance to the 
federal courts, certain factors will remain barriers to the passing of congressional 
legislation. First, partisan interests will likely always impact the effectiveness of 
congressional legislation. Depending on how long congressional authorities deliberate a 
bill, there is still potential for portions of the bill to become inefficient or obsolete shortly 
after it is passed, even if federal lawmakers consulted with S&T industry officials when 
developing the legislation. Additionally, while federal policymakers are supposed to 
appeal to their constituents to determine which S&T policy issues or concerns to address, 
there remains the potential that policymakers will disregard constituents’ policy concerns 
in favor of addressing concerns that are more significant with respect to partisan interests 
at the federal level.  
 Under similar context, even with the incorporation of S&T and legal expertise 
into the federal policymaking process, portions of future AI policies will likely still 
possess textual ambiguities. As seen with the Telecommunications Act of 1996, portions 
of federal legislation may be purposely written with ambiguities to aid in their passing 
against partisan pressures or will inadvertently possess ambiguous language because 
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policymakers lack technical knowledge for anticipating innovation. As AI technology is a 
relatively new topic of discussion for federal regulators, both partisan disagreements and 
lack of technical expertise among policymakers may result in unclear, future policy 
initiatives. Unfortunately, this also implies that there may be future miscommunication 
between federal legislators and the courts in interpreting and reinforcing federal policies.   
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Conclusion 
 Overall, this report addresses both barriers to effective federal policymaking for 
S&T issues, and how federal lawmakers may begin organizing the necessary technical 
and legal resources for initiating regulatory policy discussions for emerging AI 
technologies. I began this report by explaining that it is necessary for federal lawmakers 
to establish regulatory policies for AI technologies because current legal doctrine lacks 
direction for identifying liability or criminality when AI technologies perform in manners 
that cause physical or social damages. As it is near impossible for scientists and 
technological developers to anticipate all potential issues and performance behaviors of 
AI systems during testing periods, it would be unreasonable to hold technological 
developers fully responsible for the behaviors of their AI systems. However, a lack of 
communication between industry officials, legal experts, and federal policymakers 
hinders the creation of comprehensive, federal regulatory policies for AI technology.   
 Later, I discuss how congressional authorities, members of federal agencies, and 
non-federal entities such as scientists and engineers interact with each other in the 
creation of federal, S&T regulatory policies. While the large number of federal and non-
federal entities who may contribute to federal S&T policy research and agenda 
complicates the policymaking process, my analysis demonstrates that federal 
policymakers often determine S&T agenda in response to significant social and political 
events. Ultimately, with respect to AI technology, I find that newfound federal attention 
toward the safety and stability of AI technologies may be attributed to the Russian 
information-attacks during the 2016 American presidential election, where social-
networking sites’ artificially intelligent algorithms were weaponized to spread 
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misinformation and propaganda online leading up to Election Day. The attacks inspired 
interest among federal lawmakers in regulating AI technologies because they exposed the 
vulnerability of social media companies’ data privacy policies and the current lack of 
federal policy for managing online data collection and information-sharing practices 
(Berger & Pappas, 2018, p. 1). In response to the Russian hackings, congressional 
authorities introduced three separate bills regarding the development and implementation 
of AI technology between 2017 and 2018, and President Trump signed an E.O. for 
organizing AI policy research in February 2019.  
 However, even if federal authorities reach consensus on the domain of an S&T 
issue to successfully write a regulatory policy, this does not guarantee that the policy will 
remain appropriate for long-term implementation. As demonstrated with the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, the creation of S&T policies that are efficient long-
term is inhibited when congressional policymakers lack the necessary technical expertise 
for writing regulatory policies in manners that can anticipate and accommodate 
technological innovation. Congressional policymakers’ failures to consult with 
telecommunications industry officials when revising the Telecommunications Act of 
1934 resulted in the creation of a regulatory policy that failed to accommodate the 
development of broadband Internet services entering the 2000s. The failures of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 to accommodate technological innovation demonstrate 
that federal policymakers must communicate with appropriate S&T industry officials to 
acquire technical expertise when writing regulatory policies. 
 Federal policymakers’ lack of technical expertise and foresight for innovation 
may also enable the creation of federal policies that lack unambiguous regulatory 
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instructions. As demonstrated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and 1930 Plant 
Patent Act, unclear regulatory statutes can make it challenging for federal agencies and 
courts to determine how to interpret and reinforce federal legislation. This is especially 
dangerous when federal agencies and courts interpret the directions of federal S&T 
policies in manners that were not initially intended by policymakers, as seen in the 1930 
Plant Patent Act’s lack of distinction between “animate” and “inanimate” things.  
 Lastly, partisan disputes can also stifle the creation of comprehensive, long-term 
S&T legislation. Congressional authorities’ modification of the NSF’s charter in the late 
1960s demonstrates how partisan interests and disagreements between federal officials 
and members of the scientific community regarding what constitutes “important” S&T 
policy agenda can stifle the development of federal legislation.   
 After discussing current challenges to the creation of federal S&T regulatory 
policies, I assessed the benefits and drawbacks of three, recently introduced 
congressional bills for regulating AI technology and President Trump’s new Executive 
“AI” Order. The congressional bills and Executive Order reveal that members of 
Congress and federal agencies recognize that they must consult with legal and S&T 
industry experts to regulatory policies for AI technologies. Unfortunately, the language of 
these legislative documents to do not guarantee that S&T industry officials’ and legal 
experts’ policy input will be extensively incorporated into final congressional policy 
products.  
 However, these legislative documents are important because they provide insight 
as to how federal lawmakers should begin developing and establishing future, AI 
regulatory policies. Going forward, federal lawmakers must continue to define AI 
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technology broadly to accommodate the rapid pace of technological innovation in the AI 
industry. Future policies must also continue to suggest that members of Congress and 
S&T federal agencies be aggregated under centralized policy bodies to organize 
regulatory discussions among the Legislative and Executive branches. Yet, policy 
committees and commissions must simultaneously continue to decentralize policy 
discussions to include members of academia, S&T industry, and legal experts to provide 
non-partisan and technical input for creating AI regulatory policies. The inclusion of non-
federal perspectives in the policymaking process for AI technologies is essential for 
combating federal lawmakers’ lack of technical expertise.  
 Most importantly, future regulatory policies must utilize input from technical and 
legal experts to establish testing standards for AI technologies prior to their 
implementation. The establishment of standardized testing guidelines for AI technology 
would help combat current legal challenges of identifying liability and criminality under 
circumstances where AI technologies cause physical and social damages. In Figure Two, 
I provide examples of specific technological industry and non-profit organizations that 
possess experience in conducting policy research pertaining to the testing of AI 
technologies. Specifically, I recommend that federal lawmakers collaborate with these 
organizations to write future AI regulatory policies.  
 Collectively, this paper asserts that the creation of federal regulatory policies for 
AI technologies requires policy input from a combination of both federal and non-federal 
sources. Although citizens traditionally expect their elected representatives to promote 
and protect their policy interests under a democratic system, the technical and legal 
complexities of emerging S&T policy issues demonstrate that federal lawmakers, alone, 
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cannot be relied upon to successfully regulate emerging AI technologies. Simultaneously, 
citizens cannot solely rely upon members of the scientific and technological communities 
to regulate their emerging AI technologies, either. Research demonstrates that scientists 
are often unable to regulate their AI projects because they are usually cannot fully 
anticipate how their projects will perform prior to implementation. Additionally, research 
explains that scientists are often unwilling to regulate their AI projects in fear that doing 
so will disclose potential details or vulnerabilities of their projects, and therefore reduce 
their competitiveness on the market. The regulation of AI technologies is further 
complicated by disagreements among federal lawmakers, scientists, engineers, and legal 
experts regarding the domain and degree of issues pertaining to AI technologies.  
 With respect to who should be responsible for regulating emerging AI 
technologies, my research indicates that neither federal lawmakers nor S&T industry 
officials can regulate them on their own. Communication must transpire between federal 
and non-federal entities throughout the policymaking process, with S&T industry and 
legal experts providing federal lawmakers with their specialized expertise to assist in the 
creation of S&T regulatory policies that protect political, scientific, and legal interests 
altogether. As non-federal sources have provided federal lawmakers with policy research 
and input throughout history, it is not undemocratic for industry and legal experts to do so 
in the twenty-first century to assist in the regulation of AI technologies.  
 However, the primary challenge to democratic principles will be for federal 
lawmakers to determine to what extent the federal government should impose AI 
regulatory policies on the scientific and engineering communities. As technological 
issues become increasingly complex, it will become more difficult for federal lawmakers 
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to determine whether they should postpone enacting regulatory policies until the next 
level of innovation, or whether they should more actively regulate specific technologies 
to improve present levels of technological security. Yet, if federal policymakers develop 
and establish regulatory policies for specific technological issues preemptively, they risk 
establishing legislation that may become obsolete not long after it is passed, as seen with 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Unfortunately, there is no “proper” method for 
federal policymakers to follow in determining whether they should impose regulatory 
policies on the scientific and engineering communities. The Russian hackings of the 2016 
presidential election demonstrate that at least some regulatory policies for AI 
technologies must be established to strengthen domestic data security and privacy, and to 
begin establishing legal framework for machine-learning systems. More communication 
must also transpire between federal lawmakers, S&T industry officials, and legal experts 
to create comprehensive AI regulatory policies. Most importantly, the federal and non-
federal entities who engage in future regulatory policy discussions for AI technologies 
must be flexible when writing regulatory policies to maintain democratic integrity. Future 
regulatory discussions must acknowledge citizens’ changing concerns with AI 
technologies, and must simultaneously encourage and acknowledge technological 
innovation to safely promote political, scientific, and citizens’ interests altogether. 
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EDUCATION 
 
Lehigh University—The College of Arts & Sciences                           
            May 2018-May 2019 
• Master of Arts: Political Science with thesis research on artificial intelligence legislation, cumulative GPA 4.00  
• President’s Scholar: Awarded Presidential Scholarship to obtain M.A. degree in a fifth-year of study on free tuition                                      
                        August 2014-May 2018 
• Bachelor of Arts:  Political Science; Minor:  Computer Science, cumulative GPA 3.82, summa cum laude  
• Dean’s List placement all four years, and Fall 2018 of M.A. program 
• Member of Phi Beta Kappa 
• Member of Pi Sigma Alpha 
• National Collegiate Scholar, member of the National Society for Collegiate Scholars (NSCS) 
 
CAMPUS ENGAGEMENT 
 
Peer Advisor for Law Faculty                       
                       January 2019-May 2019 
• Served as a writing resource for a member of Lehigh’s Law faculty to assist undergraduate students who are interested in 
attending law school in writing their personal statements and learning the Harvard Bluebook citation format. 
Google Hack-A-Thon: Lehigh University                      
                           March 2019 
• Participated in a coding competition on Lehigh University’s campus as part of a team. Team placed third out of fifteen. 
Lehigh University Habitat for Humanity                      
                         August 2014-May 2019  
• Help organize and facilitate “Cardboard City” events, which aim to raise financial donations for Habitat for Humanity of the 
Lehigh Valley, and to inform members of the campus community of the polluted and impoverished housing conditions that 
persist within the Lehigh Valley. 
• Design visuals to place in campus residence halls and administrative buildings to advertise upcoming Habitat events. 
Lehigh University TRAC Program:  English as a Second Language (ESL) Working Group                   
                       September 2015-September 2018 
• Collaborated with the Director of English as a Second Language to generate written resources for TRAC Fellows to utilize 
during student conferences to better assist international students with their writing and English grammar skills. 
• Further collaborated with the Director of English as a Second Language to inform international students of writing resources on 
campus, and to discuss writing in American educational institutions. 
Lehigh University Aspiring Lawyers Club—Chair of Public Relations            
                October 2014-October 2015 
• Designed advertisements and advocated for club’s presence on social media. 
 
WORK EXPERIENCE 
 
TRAC (Technology Research And Communication) Writing Fellows Program, Lehigh University—TRAC Writing Fellow         
                                  April 2015-Septmeber 2018 
• Completed a four-credit, writing intensive training seminar to serve as a peer and faculty writing mentor. 
• Conducted meetings with faculty of assigned courses to gain understanding of course objectives and assignments. 
• Critiqued and provided virtual feedback to students for each of their writing assignments and conduct conferences with 
students to discuss their writing in-depth. 
• Observed faculty members of multiple disciplines to provide them with critique regarding lecture performances, syllabi and 
course structure. 
• Conducted interviews for TRAC Fellow applicants with program coordinators each Spring. 
• As part of a research team, conducted comparative analysis re:  the nature of writing assignments of courses offered by the 
P.C. Rossin College of Engineering in Fall 2015. A proposal was accepted for integrating the TRAC Program into the College 
of Engineering in Fall 2016, based off conducted research. 
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Kerstetter Law, LLC, Haddonfield, New Jersey--Intern                     
                       June 2017-August 2017 
• Assisted attorney, Jeffrey Kerstetter, with archive maintenance and correspondence with courthouse officials and clients. 
• Served as client eyewitness and shadowed depositions and client communications to gain exposure to the legal field. 
Lead TRAC Fellow of SOC 001:  Introduction to Sociology, Lehigh University—Lead TRAC Fellow                
                      May 2016-January 2017 
• Regularly conferenced with Dr. Danielle Lindemann and her teaching assistants throughout the Summer and Fall 2016 
semesters to acquire an understanding of course objectives and aided in the revision of syllabi and assignments. 
• Organized and orchestrated all communication between faculty members and TRAC Fellows assigned to the course. 
• Assisted TRAC Fellows who were assigned to the course in critiquing students’ writing according to faculty expectations. 
• Collaborated with Jasmine Woodsen of Library and Technology Services (LTS) to develop formal writing and researching 
strategy documents for SOC 001 students throughout the semester. 
• Developed and presented research lectures to SOC 001 students (150 students) to inform them of acceptable research 
citation styles, and disparities between credible academic sources and non-academic information. 
The Loft, Sagemore Promenade, Marlton, New Jersey—Sales Associate                    
                       July 2015-January 2016 
• Engaged in archive maintenance, organized apparel shipments and customer orders, and assisted customers to maintain a 
positive environment. 
 
SKILLS 
 
Proficient in C, C++, and Scala Programming Languages                                 
                      January 2017-May 2018 
• Wrote two separate compilers. One utilized C and C++  programming languages, and the other utilized the Scala programming 
language. 
• Developed a lexical analyzer that produces a sequence of tokens with respect to the contents of the executed file. 
• Programmed a parser that assembles the generated sequence of tokens into a syntax tree based off the context-free-grammar 
(CFG) of the file’s language. 
• Generated additional code to facilitate semantic analysis, and then display the file to standard output. 
Proficient in Java Programming Language               
              August 2016-December 2016 
• Wrote a program that enables users to import private text files. At run time, the program links to the user’s default internet 
browser and enables the user to search for any term within the imported text file. 
Proficient in Python Programming Language                      
                       June 2016-August 2016 
• Created a program that conducts statistical analysis and generates graphical representations of a pre-defined data set. 
